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
 
I. ITALIAN LAW NO LONGER TIED TO THE DOGMA SOCIETAS DELINQUERE 
NON POTEST: LEGISLATIVE DECREE NO. 231, 2001 
With the implementation of Legislative Decree No. 231 on June 8th, 
2001 (L.D. No. 231/2001), Italy aligned itself with other European 
countries (France, the United Kingdom, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, 
Ireland, Sweden, Finland), which already provided for the liability of 
corporate entities responsible for committing certain crimes.
1
 The previous 
gap in legislation had created serious implications at an international level, 
especially in light of the objective of fostering cooperation in the AFSJ 
(Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union) through, 
for example, the progressive alignment of Member States’ legislation. 
These implications were amplified by the fact that corporate crime was 
increasing more rapidly than crimes committed by individuals, with 
manifestations that often transcended national borders. In this context, Art. 
11 of Law No. 300, issued on September 29th, 2000, provided for an 
explicit delegation to the Government to regulate the administrative 
responsibility of corporate entities, with the intent to conform Italian 
legislation to the urgent pleas coming from the European Community.
2
 
Resistance to introducing corporate responsibility for crimes 
committed by managers and employees undoubtedly stemmed from the 
 
 
  Professor of Criminal Procedure, Tuscia University. 
 1. See infra note 47. 
 2. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011; Drawing up the 
Second Protocol of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial 
interests, Official Journal of the European Communities, July 19 1997. 
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traditional dogma, societas delinquere non potest, generally regarded to be 
protected in Italy under Art. 27 of the Constitution, according to which 
criminal liability is personal. This anthropocentric view led to the 
conclusion that even when the commission of crimes was facilitated by the 
organizational structure in which the individuals operated, it was only 
those individuals who took action.
3
 Corporate entities could not be held 
criminally liable for these crimes, they could only be sued in civil court for 
the damages suffered as a consequence of the crimes.
4
 
The provision of Art. 27 does not, however, necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that corporate entities should be excluded from criminal 
liability. The principle that criminal responsibility is personal could be 
understood as a prohibition against the assumption of responsibility for 
others.
5
 From this perspective, and drawing on the “organic theory,” 
according to which the actions of a corporation’s officers can be directly 
attributed to the collective entity, the legal person can be held responsible 
for the crime itself.
6
 In other words, if the corporation can be held 
responsible for the legal acts of those who carry out work on its behalf, the 
same should be true for illegal acts.
7
 This conclusion is also supported by 
recent studies on business administration, which, through bestowing the 
corporation with a more vital image, attribute decisions adopted directly 
by the corporation and not the individuals who operate within it, thus 
recognizing that the corporation itself has its own free will.
8
 
Nevertheless, for a long time and, in part, still today,
9
 Art. 27 has been 
interpreted, even by the Constitutional Court,
10
 as an affirmation of the 
principle nulla poena sine culpa, which leads to excluding the existence of 
criminal responsibility if a psychological link cannot be proven between 
 
 
 3.  See Giulio Battaglini, Responsabilità penale delle persone giuridiche?, RIV. IT. DIR. PEN. 
661 (1930). 
 4. Art. 2049 Civil Code (C.C.); Art. 83 Criminal Procedure Code [hereinafter CPC].  
 5. See Franco Bricola, Il costo del principio societas delinquere non potest nell’attuale 
dimensione del fenomeno societario, in SCRITTI DI DIRITTO PENALE—Vol. II—Tomo II—DIRITTO 
PENALE DELL’ECONOMIA 3039 (Giuffrè 1997). 
 6.  See Giancarlo De Vero, La responsabilità penale delle persone giuridiche, in TRATTATO DI 
DIRITTO PENALE 40 (Carlo Federico Grosso et al eds, Giuffrè 2008). 
 7. To conclude otherwise would create a privilege devoid of justification: Domenico Pulitanò, 
Responsabilità amministrativa per i reati delle persone giuridiche, in ENC. DIR.—AGG. VI 956 
(Giuffrè 2002). 
 8. See Paolo Bastia, Implicazioni organizzative e gestionali della responsabilità amministrativa 
delle aziende, in SOCIETAS PUNIRI POTEST. LA RESPONSABILITÀ DA REATO DEGLI ENTI COLLETTIVI 35 
(Francesco Palazzo eds., Giappichelli 2003). 
 9. See Giuseppe Amarelli, Mito giuridico ed evoluzione della realtà: il crollo del principio 
societas delinquere non potest, RIV. TRIM. DIR. PEN. EC. 982 (2003).  
 10. Corte Constituzionale, 364, 1998; Corte Constituzionale, 1085, 1998.  
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the agent and the fact.
11
 Given that criminal liability does not exist when 
intent cannot be ascertained, corporations would fall outside the criminally 
reproachable area since it would be impossible to attribute to them a 
psychological mind-set equating to intent.
12
 
Increasingly, due to the rapid growth in corporate crime, a different 
interpretation of the constitutional principle provided for by Art. 27 is 
beginning to take hold; crimes are attributed to the agent (collective and/or 
individual) who is responsible for the illegal conduct, rather than focusing 
exclusively on the psychological link between the agent and the fact.
13
 
Hence, when an individual is the mere executor of illegal behavior made 
possible because of the company policy, or the corporate organization is 
unable to oppose or prevent this conduct, the corporation can also be held 
liable.
14
 
Along the road moving away from the dogma societas delinquere non 
potest, however, a further obstacle has been encountered: the same Art. 27, 
which establishes personhood as a precondition for criminal responsibility, 
affirms that the sentence issued must have a re-educational purpose.
15
 It is 
outside the scope of this paper to evaluate the practical application of this 
objective in a nation such as Italy, in which sentences—if and when served 
—seem to be merely retributive in the majority of cases and offer few 
chances for the criminal to be rehabilitated. However, many have observed 
that a rehabilitative purpose only works if the recipient of the sentence is 
an individual who can embark on a path of reformation, which is 
impossible for a collective entity.
16
 This position is reinforced by the fact 
that corporations can change their corporate structure over time, and a 
sentence could be issued many years after the commission of the crime.
17
 
This hinders the effectiveness of the reformation process, as far as the 
organization and the management of the entity can significantly change 
 
 
 11. Supra note 5, at 3039. 
 12. Id. Whilst deeming corporate criminal liability compatible with the most basic meaning of 
personhood established by Art. 27 of the Constitution, considers the problem insurmountable if this 
article presumes intent. 
 13. For this interpretation of Art. 27 of the Constitution, See Carlo Piergallini, Societas 
delinquere et puniri potest: la fine tardiva di un dogma, RIV. TRIM. DIR. PEN. EC. 582 (2002). 
 14. See the Ministerial Report regarding L.D. No. 231/2001 [hereinafter Ministerial Report], in 
CODICE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ “DA REATO” DEGLI ENTI ANNOTATO CON LA GIURISPRUDENZA 422 
(Stefano Maria Corso eds., Giappichelli III ed. 2015). 
 15. Art. 27, § 3, Constitution. 
 16. See Alberto Alessandri, Note penalistiche sulla nuova responsabilità delle persone 
giuridiche, RIV. TRIM. DIR. PEN. EC. 44 (2002). 
 17. Alberto Alessandri, DIRITTO PENALE E ATTIVITÀ ECONOMICHE 212 (Il Mulino, 2010). 
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from the moment of the decision to that of the concrete application of 
sanction.  
The principle that criminal liability requires personhood undoubtedly 
gives rise to various considerations. Nevertheless, even this argument, 
which appears to exclude corporations from criminal liability, can be 
overcome. In fact, the effect of time passing between the commission of 
the crime and the delivery of the sentence undermines the objective of 
reformation even when the recipient of a sentence is an individual who, 
similarly, could be a completely different person many years after the fact. 
Paradoxically, even more so for corporations and for all the reasons that 
will be explained henceforth, the mere prospect of being convicted can 
push companies onto a virtuous path and be instrumental in bringing them 
back to the market with a renewed respect for legality.
18
  
II. NATURE OF THE LIABILITY 
The trend of moving away from the dogma societas delinquere non 
potest, which previously resulted in excluding corporations from criminal 
liability, has not received unanimous consensus.
19
 When L.D. No. 231 was 
introduced in 2001, it became necessary to classify corporate liability 
resulting from crimes committed within the organization or illegal conduct 
from which the corporation benefited. The Italian Legislature preferred to 
opt for an ambiguous solution, utilizing the expression responsabilità 
degli enti per gli illeciti amministrativi dipendenti da reato [corporate 
liability for administrative violations hinging on crime]. In other words, 
the conduct attributable to the entity is an administrative violation that is 
derived from crimes committed by individuals who operate within the 
organization.  
The “231” system, therefore, is aimed at tackling corporate crime, 
which can manifest itself in different forms. There are cases in which 
corporations are intrinsically illegal insofar as they were created for the 
purpose of dedicating themselves to crime; others that pursue, not as an 
exclusive objective, but predominantly, the commission of crimes; and 
finally, corporations for which criminally illegal conduct is among the 
 
 
 18. For how the re-educational purpose of the sentence can develop its full potential when the 
recipient is a corporation, see CRISTINA DE MAGLIE, L’ETICA E IL MERCATO. LA RESPONSABILITÀ 
PENALE DELLE SOCIETÀ 377 (Giuffrè 2002). 
 19. Regarding the subsequent stages in the evolution of this school of thought, See Ombretta Di 
Giovine, Lineamenti sostanziali del nuovo illecito punitivo, in REATI E RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI. 
GUIDA AL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, N. 231 20 (Giorgio Lattanzi eds., IId ed. Giuffrè 2010). 
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risks they are willing to take in order to make a profit.
20
 L.D. No. 
231/2001 seems to target legal persons that fall into the last category,
 
largely because one of the Legislature’s objectives is to bring the entity 
back into compliance with the law.
21
 This is an aim that can be realistically 
pursued only when corporations have the potential to organize themselves 
differently. This includes cases in which criminal activity is part of the 
prevailing company policy, without constituting the corporation’s 
exclusive purpose, and in cases in which the crimes are attributable to an 
organizational shortcoming or lack of oversight.  
Returning to the vexata quaestio of the nature of the liability, especially 
in the aftermath of L.D. No. 231/2001, Italian scholars were divided into 
two very different positions.
22
 Those who supported the criminal nature of 
the liability
23
 were opposed by those who favored complying with the 
legislative terminology and, therefore, concluded that the liability was 
inherently administrative.
24
 There were also those who claimed that L.D. 
No. 231/2001 introduced a tertium genus
25
: a hybrid between criminal and 
administrative responsibility. 
 
 
 20. Supra note 14, at 421. 
 21. Id. 
 22. For an updated and complete review of the different positions and the corresponding 
arguments, Marco Maria Scoletta, La responsabilità da reato delle società: principi generali e criteri 
imputativi nel d. lgs. n. 231/2001, in DIRITTO PENALE DELLE SOCIETÀ—VOL. I 867 (Giovanni Canzio 
et al. eds., Cedam 2014). 
 23. See Giancarlo De Vero, Struttura e natura giuridica dell’illecito di ente collettivo dipendente 
da reato. Luci ed ombre nell’attuazione della delega legislativa, RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN. 1167 (2001); 
See also Paolo Ferrua, Le insanabili contraddizioni della criminalità d’impresa, 29 DIR. GIUST. 8 
(2001); Giovanni Fiandaca & Enzo Musco, Diritto penale—Parte generale 165 (Zanichelli, eds. VI 
2009); Tullio Padovani, Il nome dei principi e il principio dei nomi: la responsabilità amministrativa 
delle persone giuridiche, in LA RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI: UN NUOVO ESEMPIO DI GIUSTIZIA 
PUNITIVA 16 (Giovannangelo De Francesco eds., Giappichelli 2004); Carlo Enrico Paliero, La 
responsabilità penale della persona giuridica nell’ordinamento italiano: profili sistematici, in 
SOCIETAS PUNIRI POTEST. LA RESPONSABILITÀ DA REATO DEGLI ENTI COLLETTIVI, at 32; Carlo 
Piergallini, supra note 13, at 598. More cautiously, the following Author refers to a “para-criminal” 
liability: See Antonio Fiorella, Responsabilità da reato degli enti collettivi, in DIZIONARIO DI DIRITTO 
PUBBLICO—vol. V 5101 (Sabino Cassese eds., Giuffrè 2006) . 
 24. Giovanni Cocco, L’illecito degli enti dipendente da reato e il ruolo dei modelli di 
prevenzione, RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN. 116 (2004); Giorgio Marinucci, “Societas puniri potest”: uno 
sguardo sui fenomeni e sulle discipline contemporanee, ivi, at 1203 (2002); Mario Romano, La 
responsabilità amministrativa degli enti, società o associazioni: profili generali, RIV. SOC. 410 (2002).  
 25. Supra note 16, at 58; Domenico Pulitanò, La responsabilità “da reato” degli enti 
nell’ordinamento italiano, in Responsabilità degli enti per i reati commessi nel loro interesse, CASS. 
PEN. Suppl. n.6 (2003), at 10 f.; Giovanni Flora, Le sanzioni punitive nei confronti delle persone 
giuridiche: un esempio di metamorfosi della sanzione penale, DIR. PEN. PROC. 1398 (2003); Luigi 
Stortoni & Davide Tassinari, La responsabilità degli enti: quale natura? Quali soggetti?, INDICE PEN. 
13 (2006). 
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The nomenclature did not generate interest purely for speculative 
reasons. The decision to classify the liability as criminal, administrative or 
mixed resulted in serious consequences. Only by recognizing the criminal 
nature of the responsibility can all the protections and guarantees, which 
characterize the criminal system, be extended to corporations. Otherwise, 
it is necessary to refer to the principles created for the administrative 
violation outlined in Law n. 689 introduced on November 24th, 1981, 
which undoubtedly offers fewer and less stringent safeguards to protect 
the accused.
26
  
It must be noted, however, that what is written in the statute is not 
always a reliable ally to define the nature of the liability. As the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) explains, cases can fall within the area of 
criminal liability even when they are not classified as such under national 
law.
27
 Member States often categorize illegal acts which are substantially 
criminal in nature as administrative violations in order to deny the 
defendant greater safeguards.
28
 In these cases, the Court, verifying the 
applicability of fair trial rights protected by Art. 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), decided it was not bound to the 
nomen juris established by the national Legislaure: the ECtHR determined 
the criminal nature of illegal acts even when they were not categorized as 
such under national law.
29
  
In its evaluation, the ECtHR relies on three criteria: the classification of 
the illegal act under national law (which nevertheless has only relative 
value); the nature of the violation or illegal act (general application of the 
law which defines the offense; importance of the violation);
30
 the nature 
and gravity of the penalty (punitive-deterrent purpose of the punishment;
31
 
extent to which the penalty is afflictive;
32
 extent to which the afflictive 
 
 
 26. The accused can only defend himself by producing documents or requesting to be questioned 
(Art. 18, L. 689/1981).  
 27. Giulio Ubertis, L’autonomia linguistica della Corte di Strasburgo, ARCH. PEN. 21 (2012). 
 28. See Various Authors, La matiére pénale au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme, flou du droit pénal, by Groupe de recherche droits de l’homme et logiques juridiques- 
Mirelle Delmas-Marty, dir.), REV. SC. CRIM. D. PEN. COMP. 819 (1987). 
 29. For a reconstruction of the criteria employed by the ECtHR, see Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, La 
Convenzione europea dei diritti umani, la responsabilità delle persone morali e la nozione di pena, in 
Responsabilità degli enti per i reati commessi nel loro interesse, at 34 f; see also Vittorio Manes, Art. 
7, in COMMENTARIO BREVE ALLA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA DEI DRITTI DELL’UOMO 259 (Sergio Bartole 
et al. eds., Cedam 2012). 
 30. Engel v. The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 82 (1976). 
 31. See Öztürk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 50 (1984). 
 32. See Bendenoun v. France, 284 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 47 (1994); see also Grande Stevens v. Italy, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 97 (2014). 
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penalty is appropriate for the type of violation
33
). In light of the above 
criteria, it seems that corporate liability falls within the matiére pénale of 
European matrix: the L.D. No. 231/2001 which provides for corporate 
liability is applicable for all corporations, except for some isolated and 
exempted cases. Furthermore, the penalties imposed at the end of the trial 
(which, as will be further discussed, can inhibit certain activities and/or 
negatively impact on the corporation’s assets)34 depend on the commission 
of a crime, serve a preventive function and, at the same time, are 
undeniably afflictive insomuch as they can lead (in the most serious cases) 
to the corporation being forced to leave the market. Even when 
administrative violations are only punished by imposing a financial 
penalty, the conclusions do not change: the ECtHR has decided that Art. 6 
ECHR applies even in those proceedings that conclude with a sanction that 
affects a corporation’s assets—thereby implicitly affirming their criminal 
nature.
35
 
For the reasons listed above, according to the parameters established by 
the ECtHR, a corporation’s administrative violation arising from crime 
falls within the criminal sphere, even if, at the moment, no precedents 
exist to this effect (since no supranational judge has evaluated Italian 
legislation regarding corporate criminal liability).  
There is yet another element that should be highlighted in support of 
this conclusion: the most persuasive factor indeed stems from the fact that 
the competence to judge the administrative violation is assigned to the 
criminal judge within the realm of the criminal proceeding.
36
 Furthermore, 
while introducing a sizeable number of provisions of a substantive and 
procedural nature, L.D. No. 231/2001 inserted a general clause deferring 
to the articles contained in the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), in so far 
as they are compatible.
37
 It established, yet again within the limits of 
 
 
 33. Malige v. France, App. No. 27812/95, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. § 38 (1998).  
 34. The sanctions provided for by L.D. No. 231/2001 can be disqualifying and financial. 
Regarding this point, see infra Part V. 
 35. Raimondo v. Italy, 281 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 43 (1994). The ECtHR has recently affirmed that the 
criminal nature of a proceeding is contingent on the gravity of the sanction (even financial) abstractly 
applicable rather than the gravity of the sanction actually imposed: Grande Stevens v. Italy, § 98, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2014). 
 36. This choice has led to, among other effects, the adoption of various principles that typically 
characterize criminal law: first and foremost, the principle of legality in its various forms, including 
statutory reserve, clarity and prohibition of retroactivity (Art. 2, L.D. No. 231/2001). The corporation, 
in fact, cannot be held liable for a fact that constitutes a crime if its administrative responsibility and 
the corresponding sanctions were not explicitly provided for (clarity) by legislation in-force (statutory 
reserve) before commission of the fact (prohibition of retroactivity). See Ombretta Di Giovine, supra 
note 19, at 46. 
 37. Art. 34, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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compatibility, that in the case of corporations, the provisions intended for 
the defendant will be applied.
38
 Selecting criminal proceedings as the 
setting within which the corporation’s administrative violation should be 
ascertained and equating the corporation to the main subject of criminal 
proceedings, regardless of how the liability is labeled, can only imply the 
need to adhere to the rules of these proceedings (such as the articles 
contained in the CPC as well as those provided for by the Constitution).
39
 
This is contingent, of course, upon the satisfaction of the requirement of 
compatibility established by the same L.D. No. 231/2001. 
It is, in fact, through verification of the compatibility of certain rules 
with the general structure of corporate criminal liability, as outlined by 
L.D. No. 231/2001, that the legislation in question gains credibility. This 
is true to an even greater extent since compatibility, or rather, lack thereof, 
has often been called upon as a justification in corporate proceedings not 
to follow some of the principles established for criminal proceedings 
against individuals. 
III. SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
According to Art. 1, L.D. No. 231/2001, responsibility for 
administrative violations stemming from criminal offenses can be 
attributed to all entities—except for the State, local authorities (such as 
Regions, Provinces and Municipalities), and other non-economic public 
entities, as well as entities which carry out constitutional functions (such 
as political parties and trade unions). The case-law shows that “mixed” 
corporations fall within the subjective area of L.D. No. 231/2001: mixed 
corporations refer to those entities that, while being formally considered 
public bodies, are endowed with all the proper characteristics of an 
incorporated company.
40
 The highest court in Italy, the Court of Cassation, 
maintains that defining an entity as a corporation presumes that it carries 
out an economic activity with the objective of making profit, which is 
sufficient to warrant the applicability of L.D. No. 231/2001.  
Regarding the objective prerequisites for liability, the administrative 
violation attributed to the corporation necessitates a complex structure. A 
corporation, in fact, is directly responsible for the administrative violation 
 
 
 38. Art. 35, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 39. See MARIA LUCIA Di Bitonto, STUDIO SUI FONDAMENTI DELLA PROCEDURA PENALE 
D’IMPRESA 59 (Editoriale Scientifica 2012). 
 40. The case in issue involves an interregional hospital structure constituted under the form of a 
corporation: Cass., sez. II, July 9th 2010, PM in proc. Vielmi, CASS. PEN. (2011), at 1888. 
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arising from a crime committed in its interest or to its advantage
41
 by 
subjects belonging to its organization.
42
 The rationale behind this 
innovation is that the company’s structural arrangement is considered the 
true instigator, executor, or beneficiary of the criminal conduct. This 
mechanism was implemented to widen the sphere of those can be subject 
to criminal proceedings,
43
 making all entities responsible for preventing 
crimes carried out in their interest or to their advantage. A peculiarity of 
the new system is represented by the autonomy of corporate and individual 
liability. According to Art. 8, L.D. No. 231/2001, the corporation’s 
responsibility exists even when the author of the crime has not been 
identified, or when the crime ceases to exist for a cause other than 
amnesty.
44
 
It is essential to note that the legislation does not apply to the 
commission of any crime. In order to trigger this type of liability, the 
offense must involve transgressions explicitly contemplated by Art. 24 ff., 
L.D. No. 231/2001. When the legislation was passed, the Government 
opted for gradual experimentation. Not all the offenses to which Law No. 
300/2000 referred were included because prudence was deemed 
necessary.
45
 Corporate criminal liability proceedings were to be tested for 
specific and limited categories of transgressions, which represented the 
most common manifestations of corporate crime at that moment.
46
 Over 
the years, however, the list of offenses has been modified and extended,
47
 
 
 
 41. The interest is ascertained with an ex ante evaluation, putting oneself in the place of the agent 
at the moment of the commission of the fact; the advantage, however, is verified ex post, and could 
subsist for the corporation, even if the agent did not act with a specific pro societate objective. See 
Ombretta Di Giovine, supra note 19, at 70. Nevertheless, if the alleged crime was committed in the 
exclusive interest of the individual who executed the fact or a third party, the corporation cannot be 
held liable (Art. 5, § 2, L.D. No. 231/2001). 
 42. Art. 5, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 43. See Carlo Enrico Paliero, Dieci anni di “corporate liability” nel sistema italiano: il 
paradigma imputativo nell’evoluzione della legislazione e della prassi, LE SOCIETÀ. GLI SPECIALI 8 
(2011). 
 44. The principle of autonomy is interpreted to mean that collective responsibility is not tied to 
individual liability. It is tied, however, to the realization of the alleged crime, the constitutive elements 
of which must be determined. See Domenico Pulitanò, supra note 25, at 23. 
 45. Environmental crimes and Work health and Safety crimes, already provided for by Law No. 
300/2000, at the beginning, were not included in L.D. No. 231/2001 since they are negligent crimes. 
 46. Improper/undue receipt of funds, fraud against the State or a public entity or to obtain public 
funds; bribery and corruption. 
 47. To date, the crimes that can entail corporate liability in the form of an administrative 
violation are the following: improper/undue receipt of funds, fraud against the State or a public entity 
or to obtain public funds, computer fraud against the State or a public entity (Art. 24, L.D. No. 
231/2001); computer-related crimes and illegal use of personal data (Art. 24-bis, L.D. No. 231/2001); 
offenses related to organized crime (Art. 24-ter, L.D. No. 231/2001); bribery, improper incitement to 
give or promise benefits and corruption (Art. 25, L.D. No. 231/2001); counterfeiting coins, legal 
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with the addition, for example, of some crimes committed unintentionally. 
The inclusion of negligent crimes is still widely debated, since the criteria 
for attributing liability to the corporation seem to presume voluntary and 
conscious execution by the individual who acts (therefore, requiring a 
psychological link showing a disposition of intent).
48
  
The crime from which the administrative violation stems must have as 
its author an individual who carries out representation, administration, or 
management within the corporation, including that of an organizational 
unit.
49
 This definition encompasses individuals who are responsible, even 
de facto, for management and supervision—high-level officers—as well as 
individuals subject to the management and control of the former—
subordinate employees.
50
 As previously mentioned, it is necessary for the 
criminal conduct to be either in the interest, or to the benefit, of the 
company. This is assumed to be the case even when an individual acts 
purely for his own personal profit. Understandably, it is the most likely 
option—at least for crimes classified as intentional—since it is more than 
plausible that the agent is seeking personal gain when he breaks the law, 
thereby creating an economic advantage for the organization for which he 
works. A prime example would be an individual who, in order to obtain 
economic incentives contingent upon the achievement of certain results, 
commits bribery. As a result of the offense, the corporation is awarded 
 
 
tender, duty stamps, identification instruments and distinctive signs (Art. 25-bis, L.D. No. 231/2001); 
crimes against industry and trade (Art. 25-bis.1, L.D. No. 231/2001); corporate crimes (Art. 25-ter, 
L.D. No. 231/2001); offenses with the aim of terrorism and subversion of the democratic order (Art. 
25-quater, L.D. No. 231/2001); the practice of mutilation of female genital organs (Art. 25-quater.1, 
L.D. No. 231/2001); crimes against the individual (Art. 25-quinquies, L.D. No. 231/2001); market 
abuse (Art. 25-sexies, L.D. No. 231/2001); manslaughter or personal injury caused by a breach of the 
health and safety at work regulations (Art. 25-septies, L.D. No. 231/2001); crimes of receiving stolen 
goods, money laundering and utilization of money, goods or benefits of unlawful origin (Art. 25-
octies, L.D. No. 231/2001); offenses related to the violation of copyright laws (Art. 25-novies, L.D. 
No. 231/2001); incitement to not make statements or to make false statements before the judicial 
authority (Art. 25-decies, L.D. No. 231/2001); environmental crimes (Art. 25-undecies, L.D. No. 
231/2001); employment of illegally staying third-country nationals (Art. 25-duodecies, L.D. No. 
231/2001). By now the list represents an irrational catalogue of crimes because, for example, the 
crimes of prostitution or child pornography cannot be considered an expression of corporate crime. See 
Giorgio Lattanzi, Introduzione, in LA RESPONSABILITÀ DA REATO DEGLI ENTI COLLETTIVI: A DIECI 
ANNI DAL D. LGS. N. 231/2001. PROBLEMI APPLICATIVI E PROSPETTIVE DI RIFORMA 221 (Alfonso 
Maria Stile et al. eds., Jovene 2013). 
 48. For the adaptation of the criterion of interest or advantage for negligent offenses (that would 
seem to assume the psychological element of intent on the part of the subject that executed the alleged 
fact), Domenico Pulitanò, Responsabilità degli enti e reati colposi, in LA RESPONSABILITÀ DA REATO 
DEGLI ENTI COLLETTIVI: A DIECI ANNI DAL D. LGS. N. 231/2001. PROBLEMI APPLICATIVI E PROSPETTIVE 
DI RIFORMA, at 246. 
 49. Supra note 14, at 427. 
 50. Art. 6, § 1, a), L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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public contracts that otherwise would have been denied (or granted subject 
to different and less profitable conditions). 
From a subjective point of view, the criteria change according to who 
committed the presumed crime. When company officers are those directly 
involved, it is sufficient to meet the above-mentioned objective 
requirements to affirm corporate liability. In this case, the corporation in 
question could avoid liability by demonstrating that it had both adopted, 
and effectively implemented, adequate compliance programs ante delictum 
to prevent the type of offense that occurred.
51
 There is, however, an 
additional requirement. The company must prove due diligence relating to 
monitoring the functioning of, and adherence to, the program. It must 
show that oversight was entrusted to a Surpervisory and Control Body 
equipped with the power of initiative and control
52
 and that there was not a 
lack of vigilance by the Body.
53
 Finally, the corporation must demonstrate 
that the individual committed the crime by fraudulently circumventing the 
program.
54
 
If, on the other hand, the presumed offense is traced to a subordinate 
employee, according to the criteria for corporate liability, the company has 
to respond only as far as the Prosecutor succeeds in proving that the crime 
is the result of an omission of company’s duties. This is an element, 
however, that the Legislature excludes when adequate compliance 
programs were effectively implemented ante factum. 
Inevitably, of the two subjective criteria for bringing charges against 
the corporation, the first has led to greater perplexity. It seems hard to 
accept its implementation within a criminal system ruled by the 
presumption of innocence
55
 and in which the burden of proof falls upon 
the prosecution.
56
 According to L.D. No. 231/2001, when the crime is 
committed by corporate officers, the Prosecutor has to determine whether 
the illegal conduct corresponds to one of the offenses provided for by L.D. 
No. 231/2001. Then he has to prove that the offense can be attributed to 
the administrators and a financial interest or advantage for the corporation 
 
 
 51. Art. 6, § 1, b), L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 52. Art. 6, § 1, d, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 53. Art. 6, § 1, c, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 54. Fraudulent evasion would involve conduct by which the virtuous rules of the organization are 
bypassed. Giorgio Fidelbo, L’accertamento dell’idoneità del modello organizzativo in sede giudiziale, 
in LA RESPONSABILITÀ DA REATO DEGLI ENTI COLLETTIVI: A DIECI ANNI DAL D. LGS. N. 231/2001. 
PROBLEMI APPLICATIVI E PROSPETTIVE DI RIFORMA, at 190.  
 55. Art. 27, § 2, Constitution. 
 56. See Giulio Illuminati, LA PRESUNZIONE D’INNOCENZA DELL’IMPUTATO 120 (Zanichelli 
1979). 
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exists. In this scenario, corporate liability is presumed, unless the company 
proves the existence of conditions excluding its involvement in the matter.  
A problem of inconsistency arises only if we assume that the 
presumption of innocence also prevails in the “231” system. This 
conclusion implies that this kind of corporate liability is criminal. 
Nevertheless, the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
to reinforce the principle of the presumption of innocence excludes 
corporations from its area of application, affirming: at the current stage of 
development of national law and of case-law at national and Union level, 
it is premature to legislate at Union level on the presumption of innocence 
with regard to legal persons. This Directive should not, therefore, apply to 
legal persons. This should be without prejudice to the application of the 
presumption of innocence as laid down, in particular, in the ECHR and as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights and by Court of 
Justice, to legal persons.
57
 The Directive is difficult to understand, 
especially given the ECtHR’s clear track record of recognizing the 
guarantees typical of the criminal system, even for proceedings that have a 
different nomen juris. Moreover, in some European states, corporate 
liability is explicitly categorized as criminal and in others, such as Italy, 
the evaluation of this liability is nevertheless assigned to a criminal 
judge.
58
 
However, we must verify whether—at the national level—the 
presumption of innocence should rule in the “231” regime, as is widely 
sustained by scholars.
59
 The Court of Cassation seems to be on the same 
page, recognizing that no reversal of the burden of proof is discernible in 
the law which regulates corporate liability and, hence, the Prosecutor has 
to demonstrate the commission of a crime, regardless of whether the 
 
 
 57. Whereas n. 14—Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to 
be present at the trial in criminal proceedings. 
 58. For an overview of the criminal liability of legal persons from the perspective of European 
Union legislation, see Nicola Selvaggi, Ex crimine liability of legal persons in EU legislation. An 
Overview of Substantive Criminal Law, 4 EUR. CRIM. L. REV. 46 (2014). 
 59. The interpretations are, however, very different from one another. There are those who claim 
that Art. 6, L.D. No. 231/2001 creates an irreconcilable conflict with the constitutional guarantee: 
Ennio Amodio, Prevenzione del rischio penale d’impresa e modelli integrati di responsabilità degli 
enti, CASS. PEN. 320, 333, n.49 (2005); Alessandro Bernasconi, L’elusione fraudolenta del modello, in 
MANUALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI 174 (Adonella Presutti & Alessandro Bernasconi eds, 
Giuffrè 2013); there are others who deem it possible to interpret the legislation in such a way 
congruent with the Constitution. See, e.g., Maria Lucia Di Bitonto, supra note 39, at 74; Gianluca 
Varraso, IL PROCEDIMENTO PER GLI ILLECITI AMMINISTRATIVI DIPENDENTI DA REATO 366 (Giuffrè 
2012); Paolo Moscarini, I principi generali del procedimento de societate, DIR. PEN. PROC. 1275 
(2011). 
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alleged crime was committed by a corporate officer or subordinate 
employee.
60
 This inversion of the onus of proof for the transgressions of 
company officers will be further analyzed in relation to compliance 
programs.
61
 
IV. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
An examination of the application criteria for L.D. No. 231/2001 
reveals a fundamental element: the importance of compliance programs 
which, if implemented ante delictum, can exclude the corporation from 
liability. If the compliance programs are adopted post factum, they can still 
result in attenuation of the penalties.
62
 The significant effects of these 
programs during the precautionary procedure will be subsequently 
discussed.
63
  
The “231” system highly regards corporations that are equipped (or 
willing to equip themselves) with a structure that is able to neutralize the 
prospect of crimes being committed within the organization. This reflects 
the special preventive purpose, which is the defining characteristic of the 
legislation.  
Clearly inspired by compliance programs originating in the United 
States, the “231” system requires corporations to identify areas that 
represent the highest risk for illegal activity, provide for specific and direct 
protocols regarding crimes to be prevented, identify procedures to manage 
financial resources that are adequate to prevent transgressions, define 
essential information that must be given to an independent organization 
entrusted with monitoring the operation of, and compliance with, the 
programs (Surpervisory and Control Body), and implement a disciplinary 
system which adequately punishes those who do not comply with the 
measures specified in the program.
64
  
The law unequivocally established that it is not sufficient for 
corporations to merely adopt the programs; they must be effectively 
implemented. In other words, to exclude or mitigate corporate liability, the 
 
 
 60. See Cass., sez. VI, February 18th 2010, Scarafia, CASS. PEN. 1878 (2011). The burden of 
proof would be transformed into an onus of evidence. It would, therefore, be sufficient for the 
corporation to submit its compliance program to the judge: the “evidentiary effort” that must be made 
by the corporation only consists of demonstrating that a program has been adopted because, as part of 
standard procedure, it is the judge to ascertain the effectiveness and suitability. See Giorgio Fidelbo, 
supra note 54, at 188. 
 61. See infra Part 8. 
 62. Art. 12, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 63. See infra Part VIII. 
 64. Art. 6, § 2, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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programs must shape corporate operations in such a way that corporate 
activity complies with the behavioral protocols established therein.
65
 
Furthermore, the corporation must provide for the updating of these 
programs over time, when there have been changes in the legislation or in 
corporate structure. 
In the aftermath of L.D. No. 231/2001, these compliance programs 
were greeted very coldly by corporate entities because they were aware 
that the adoption of such programs would not, in and of itself, protect 
corporations from liability.
66
 The adequacy of these programs was subject 
to a judge’s assessment (a criminal judge who was certainly not 
accustomed to evaluating notions of a corporate nature). They were 
concerned, moreover, that the Courts, having to express a decision 
regarding the adequacy of these programs at the moment in which the 
crime was committed within the corporation, would only issue a negative 
judgment to this effect.
67
  
This prejudice has been overcome because it has been proven that this 
assessment is conducted ex ante and not ex post: the judge, therefore, must 
place himself at the time in which the crime arose in order to evaluate if, 
even with the existence of a virtuous compliance program, it still would 
not have been possible to foresee, and hence avoid, that crime.
68
 
Furthermore, the judge does not have to express a decision with regard to 
the adequacy of the program as a whole but only in regard to the area in 
which the specific crime was committed.
69
 Owing to the fears surrounding 
criminal judges’ lack of training in the corporate field, evaluation of the 
programs is often entrusted to experts who possess the necessary technical 
expertise to assist the magistrate in this task.
70
 
 
 
 65. The L.D. No. 231/2001 did not introduce an obligation to adopt (and effectively execute) the 
programs; rather, it established their adoption as a cause for exclusion from (or attenuation of) liability. 
Nevertheless, these programs are often required as a prerequisite for establishing, or continuing, 
contractual relationships with public entities (especially the Regions). For an updated review on the 
topic, See Piero Magri & Matteo De Paolis, Modelli di organizzazione ed esenzione di responsabilità: 
aspetti pratici ed operativi, in DIRITTO PENALE DELLE SOCIETÀ—VOL I, at 933. Furthermore, judicial 
precedent has determined that the lack of programs, in the case of conviction according to L.D. No. 
231/2001, can result in civil responsibility for the president or the CEO of the corporation, with the 
consequent obligation to compensate the corporation (Trib. Milano, sez. VIII civile, February 13th 
2008, n.1774, LE SOCIETÀ 1507 (2008).  
 66. Giorgio Fidelbo, supra note 54, at 174. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 182. 
 69. See id. at 179. 
 70. See, e.g., Perizia collegiale disposta dal G.I.P. presso il Tribunale di Bari per accertare 
l’idoneità e l’adeguatezza preventiva dei Modelli di Organizzazione, Gestione e Controllo del rischio 
reato, adottati da una società farmaceutica, imputata degli illeciti amministrativi da reato di cui agli 
Artt. 24 e 25 D. Lgs. n.231/2001, RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN. 1434 (2010). 
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Various uncertainties remain, however, especially regarding the 
content of the programs. While Art. 6, L.D. No. 231/2001 supplied some 
useful recommendations concerning the drafting of the programs, it 
nevertheless left the task of adapting these indications to each individual 
corporation based on its unique circumstances.  
In these first ten years of experimentation, notwithstanding 
corporations’ significant investment to equip themselves with compliance 
programs, judges have largely deemed the programs inadequate.
71
 For this 
reason, there was a proposal of introducing a certification process, to be 
entrusted to highly specialized experts responsible for assessing the 
adequacy of the programs, issuing, in the event of a positive outcome, a 
certificate that could be shown during judicial proceedings.
72
 Nevertheless, 
this proposal was discarded
73
 because issuing a certification endorsing the 
suitability of the programs would bind the judge, preventing a different 
decision. It was unlikely to stand up to constitutional scrutiny.
74
 Even if 
not binding, it would involve an additional element that would have to be 
taken into account by the judge and oblige him to produce a more detailed 
ground.
75
 
This alternative seems to have been abandoned. The Courts’ rulings 
regarding the matter are being utilized as guidelines when drafting the 
programs. In these decisions, in fact, it is possible to find the elements 
deemed indispensable in order to receive a favorable judgment when the 
adequacy of the compliance programs is scrutinized.
76
 Above all, special 
attention is paid to the protocols by which the areas at risk of crime are 
regulated: they must not be generic but, rather, must be adapted to suit the 
 
 
 71. To date, only one Italian corporation’s compliance program has passed judicial control at the 
first level—Tribunale di Milano, Ufficio del Giudice dell’udienza preliminare, November 17th 2009, 
Impregilo, LE SOCIETÀ 473 (2010) and second level court hearings—Corte app. Milano, sez. II, March 
21st 2012, Impregilo, in www.dirittopenalecontemporaneo. Recently, however, the Cassation 
expressed a different opinion, annulling the sentence that had excluded the corporation from liability 
due to the inadequacy of the compliance program. According to the Cassation, the program that 
regarded the specific area in which the crime was committed had been established to allow the 
administrators to more easily evade the rules: Cass., sez. V, December 18th 2013, Impregilo, in 
www.dirittopenalecontemporaneo. 
 72. Outline of the bill proposed to amend L.D. No. 231/2001, published in CASS. PEN. 4040 
(2010). 
 73. Giovanni Maria Flick, Le prospettive di modifica del D. Lgs. n.231/200, in materia di 
responsabilità amministrativa degli enti: un rimedio peggiore del male?, CASS. PEN. 4032 (2010).  
 74. Art. 101, § 2 Constitution provides that judges are only subject to the law.  
 75. See Giorgio Fidelbo, supra note 54, at 193, according to whom the introduction of the 
certificate in question would require the judge to provide a lengthier explanation when evaluating the 
programs. 
 76. Tribunale di Roma, Ufficio del Giudice dell’udienza preliminare, April 4th 2003, Finspa, 
CASS. PEN. 2807 (2003). 
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corporation’s unique circumstances, providing for effective control 
mechanisms.
77
 One of the ways to achieve effective control is by 
entrusting the verification of each decision-making procedure to more than 
one subject.
78
 The meaning is clear: the program cannot be a mere 
façade.
79
 Instead, it must express the corporation’s true commitment to 
implement, within the scope of the sensitive areas, suitable mechanisms to 
prevent the risk of crime.
80
 Furthermore, judicial precedent has highlighted 
the importance of information channels between the corporate officers, 
employees, and the monitoring system, which must be specifically 
outlined and respected. Through their rulings, judges have articulated 
certain guidelines regarding the composition and duties of the Supervisory 
and Control Bodies, which must be, and appear, independent.
81
 They must 
actually and effectively monitor compliance with protocols—a function 
that they can only implement if they are constantly informed by the 
management of the at-risk areas and are entrusted with investigative 
powers in all sensitive sectors.
82
  
 
 
 77. Carlo Piergallini, I modelli organizzativi, in REATI E RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI. GUIDA 
AL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231, at 185. 
 78. This directive has led to various problems when applied to family-run corporations (even 
those of a considerable size) that are so widespread in Italy, in which there is a significant 
concentration of the decisional power at the top—where all the strategic choices for the company are 
made. For this reason, in the aftermath of the introduction of L.D. No. 231/2001, prestigious 
representatives of American academia have highlighted the difficulties that continental European 
countries, such as Italy, will have to effectively execute the legislation because of the notable presence 
of family-run companies. See John C. Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and 
Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198 (2005). 
 79. Regarding such a risk for the compliance programs that are already part of the American 
system, See Kimberly D. Krawiec, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: After 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future Disclosure System: Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
 80. The Legislature has provided that corporations must follow the indications supplied by trade 
associations when drafting the programs. Over the years, useful guidelines have been developed to 
direct affiliated companies in this complex task. Nevertheless, the programs cannot be a mere copy of 
these documents, which do not take into account the specific characteristics of each corporation. For 
helpful indications regarding the drafting of behavioral protocols that constitute an important part of 
the programs, See Carlo Piergallini, Paradigmatica dell’autocontrollo penale (dalla funzione alla 
struttura del “Modello Organizzativo” ex D. Lgs. n.231/2001) (Parte II), CASS. PEN. 845 (2013). 
 81. For these reasons, judicial precedent has established that the Supervisory and Control Body 
must be characterized by autonomy, independence and professionalism. Therefore, it must be formed 
by people who possess the expertise to carry out the function and cannot be composed by those who sit 
on the Board of Directors (since this situation would entail an overlap between the controller and the 
controlled) or those who belong to the Board of Statutory Auditors (who have among their tasks that of 
drawing up the financial statements and, hence, operate—even if indirectly—in a potential at-risk 
area). 
 82. Supra note 76. See also Carlo Piergallini, Paradigmatica dell’autocontrollo penale (dalla 
funzione alla struttura del “Modello Organizzativo” ex D. Lgs. n.231/2001) (Parte I), CASS. PEN. 389 
(2013). 
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If a corporation lacks a compliance program outright, or has an 
inadequate model, there are several procedural turning points at which it 
can manifest its intention to implement a suitable program. The 
Legislature strongly encourages corporations to make this decision by 
extending numerous advantages to those that intend to turn over a new 
leaf, offering them opportunities to collaborate with the authorities 
throughout the entire course of the proceeding, from the investigative 
phase to the final ruling.
83
 With L.D. No. 231/2001, the Legislature 
attempted to bring the corporate entity back into compliance with the law. 
Corporate liability should serve as a deterrent against the commission of 
illegal acts or, when criminal conduct has already taken place, provide the 
framework within which the corporation can be brought back to the 
market with a renewed commitment to legality.  
V. APPLYING SANCTIONS 
In cases where a corporation is found liable, the system for imposing 
penalties established by L.D. No. 231/2001
84
 provides for the exacting of a 
financial penalty, applied utilizing a quota system.
85
 A list of disqualifying 
penalties has also been introduced, which prohibits the corporation from 
engaging in certain activities,
86
 and can only be imposed on corporations 
found guilty of certain crimes.
87
 Furthermore, the law provides for the 
confiscation (the “expropriation by the State”88) of the price or the profit 
derived from a crime.
89
 
The formula established for calculating the financial penalty is based 
on a quota system.
90
 The judge determines the value of the quota 
according to the corporation’s financial circumstances. He then decides 
how many quotas to apply based on indexes that measure the seriousness 
of the illegal act, taking into account the following: the seriousness of the 
crime, the degree of responsibility, and the corporation’s commitment to 
 
 
 83. Regarding collaboration as a central concept in L.D. No. 231/2001, see Rosa Anna Ruggiero, 
Le condotte di collaborazione previste nel D. Lgs. n.231 del 2001, CASS. PEN. 397 (2014). 
 84. See CARLO Piergallini, I reati presupposto della responsabilità dell’ente e l’apparato 
sanzionatorio, in REATI E RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI. GUIDA AL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231, at 
222. 
 85. Art. 10, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 86. Art. 9, § 2, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 87. Art. 13, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 88. The definition is from Giovanni Fiandaca & Enzo Musco, supra note 23, at 845.  
 89. Art. 19, L.D. No. 231/2001. Notwithstanding the fact that confiscation is considered to be a 
patrimonial security measure in the Italian system, L.D. No. 231/2001 utilizes it as a primary sanction. 
 90. Art. 11, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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eliminate, or attenuate, the consequences of the crime as well as its efforts 
to prevent such illegal conduct in the future. The Legislature has, 
moreover, fostered virtuous behavior by making the amount of financial 
penalties dependent on the damages caused by the crime, and also by 
offering a reward for companies that have done their best to minimize the 
detrimental effects of their conduct.
91
 The financial sanction is reduced by 
half when it is proven that the agent committed the crime predominantly in 
his own interests or those of third parties. In these cases, the corporation 
did not obtain a financial advantage or, at least, the financial advantage 
was minimal. The same reduction also applies when the damage caused is 
especially tenuous. On the other hand, the sanction is reduced by a third to 
half if, before the trial, a corporation compensates for the damage in full, 
eliminates the detrimental or dangerous consequences of the crime, or 
makes a concerted effort to this effect. This reduction is—of course—
contingent upon the corporation creating and maintaining a compliance 
program that is adequate to prevent the crime from reoccurring.
92
 When 
both the final conditions listed above are present, the financial penalty is 
reduced by a half to two thirds.
93
 
In addition to the financial sanctions, disqualifying penalties, which 
also can result in serious financial losses for the corporation, are among 
the most dreaded penalties.
94
 The statute lists these disqualifying sanctions 
in order of descending severity: disqualification of the corporation’s 
activity; suspension or revocation of authorizations, licenses and 
concessions utilized in the commission of the crime; prohibition banning 
negotiations with the public administration; exclusion from tax breaks, 
financing, grants or subsidies as well as revocation of those already 
granted; and prohibition banning the publicizing of goods or services.
95
  
Disqualifying sanctions can produce very serious consequences. In the 
most serious cases, the corporation can even be forced out of the market. 
 
 
 91. Art. 12, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 92. A defining element of the penalty system is the severity of the sanctions combined with the 
possibility of attenuation when the corporation decides to change course in order to regain legality. See 
Maria Eugenia Oggero, Responsabilità delle società e degli enti collettivi (profili sostanziali), in DIG. 
DISC. PEN.—AGG., 808 (Alfredo Gaito eds, Utet 2010). Italy has extensively tested this technique—
known as “the carrot and stick”—in organized crime proceedings, first against terrorism and then 
against the mafia, as a means to induce collaboration with the authorities. See Rosa Anna Ruggiero, 
L’ATTENDIBILITÀ DELLE DICHIARAZIONI DEI COLLABORATORI DI GIUSTIZIA NELLA CHIAMATA IN 
CORREITÀ 16 (Giappichelli 2012). 
 93. Art. 12, § 3, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 94. Alessandro Bernasconi, L’apparato sanzionatorio, in MANUALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ 
DEGLI ENTI, at 186. 
 95. Art. 9, § 2, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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This penalty is only applied for administrative violations stemming from 
specific, predetermined crimes—those that represent a sub-category of the 
offenses explicitly listed in the legislation. Furthermore, the 
implementation of these sanctions depends on two conditions: the 
corporation must have obtained a sizeable profit, and the illegal act must 
have been committed by high-level corporate officers (or, if perpetrated by 
subordinate employees, the offense should have been caused or facilitated 
by serious organizational shortcomings). These sanctions may also be 
applied in the case of recidivism. Disqualifying penalties are not imposed 
if, before the trial, a corporation compensates for the damage in full, 
eliminating the detrimental or dangerous consequences of the crime, or 
when it redresses the organizational shortcomings by implementing 
suitable compliance programs and turning over the profit obtained from 
the crime to the State.
96
 Except for the criterion of turning over the profit 
obtained from the crime, these are the same conditions that allow for a 
reduction in the financial penalty as well. 
The Legislature specifies that disqualifying sanctions must be aimed at 
the specific department in which the crime was committed because this 
division is exactly the area that has to be neutralized.
97
 The judge 
determines the type and duration of the sanctions necessary to prevent the 
offense from reoccurring.
98
 For example, the disqualification banning 
negotiations with the public administration can be limited to certain 
contracts, or only apply to predetermined public agencies.
99
 Similarly, the 
judge can suspend or revoke authorizations, licenses or concessions 
relating to the execution of those specific functions, but only when other 
sanctions have proven to be inadequate.
100
 
In place of disqualifying sanctions, the corporation’s administration 
can be taken over by a commissioner, if continuation of the corporation’s 
activity is crucial to ensuring law and order or employment needs.
101
 The 
judge defines both the duties and the authority of the commissioner, who 
is mainly responsible for revising the corporation’s organizational 
structure, implementing adequate compliance programs to prevent the 
crime from reoccurring in the future.
102
  
 
 
 96. Art. 17, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 97. See Ministerial Report, supra note 14, at 440. 
 98. See id. at 441. 
 99. See id. at 440. 
 100. Art. 14, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 101. Art. 15, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 102. See Ministerial Report, supra note 14, at 442. 
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Disqualifying sanctions can be applied for temporarily or permanently, 
if the corporation shows absolutely no willingness to comply with the 
law.
103
 In the case of temporary application, the judge does not have any 
discretion. Once the conditions for imposing these penalties are 
ascertained, the judge is obligated to levy the appropriate sanctions.
104
 On 
the other hand, for a permanent sanction, the judge must conduct a 
thorough evaluation to determine whether the application of such sanction 
is absolutely necessary.
105
 
The sanctions are subject to the statute of limitations, and therefore the 
punitive power of the State cannot be exercised more than five years from 
the time of the alleged crime. Nevertheless, as soon as the administrative 
violation is contested to the corporation,
106
 the statute of limitations is 
interrupted until the final ruling. In other words, once the trial against the 
corporation has begun, the statute of limitations can no longer be invoked. 
The mechanism governing the statute of limitations in proceedings 
against individuals follows distinct rules. For this reason, the proceeding 
against the individual could stop when the statute of limitations has passed 
while the trial against the corporation continues.
107
 This solution has been 
criticized for violating the constitutional principle of equality.
108
 It could 
also undermine a fundamental concept of the “231” system: the need for a 
contextual evaluation of the offense committed by the individual and the 
administrative violation committed by the corporation.
109
 Nevertheless, 
this provision is a natural extension of the principle of autonomy between 
corporate and individual liability.
110
  
VI. GENERAL PROVISIONS REGULATING CORPORATE LIABILITY 
PROCEEDINGS 
L.D. No. 231/2001 mainly establishes procedural rules, which are, in 
fact, greater in number than those that exist in substantive law. It is not, 
 
 
 103. The definitive disqualifying sanction can be inflicted in the event of a sizeable profit and 
when the corporation has been sentenced, at least three times in the past seven years, to a temporary 
disqualification prohibiting the corporation from carrying out its activity. 
 104. See Francesco Mucciarelli, Le sanzioni interdittive temporanee nel d. lgs. n.231/2001, in 
STUDI IN ONORE DI GIORGIO MARINUCCI—VOL III 2507 (Emilio Dolcini et al. eds., Giuffrè 2006). 
 105. Art. 14, § 4, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 106. See infra Part IX. 
 107. Art. 22, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 108. Riccardo Lottini, Il sistema sanzionatorio, in Various Authors, RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI 
PER ILLECITI AMMINISTRATIVI DIPENDENTI DA REATO 176 (Giulio Garuti eds., Cedam 2002). 
 109. Art. 38, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 110. Art. 8, L.D. No. 231/01. 
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however, only a question of quantitative predominance: the procedural 
provisions that shape corporate liability proceedings are of critical 
importance and represent the foundation for the legislation, as judicial 
precedent has demonstrated. Judges have always regarded this second part 
of the L.D. No. 231/2001 as paramount, which—as will be seen shortly—
is largely due to the pivotal nature of the precautionary system.
111
 
The Legislature decided to assign corporate criminal liability cases to a 
criminal judge within the context of a criminal proceeding; in fact, Art. 34, 
L.D. No. 231/2001 provides for the proceeding regarding the 
administrative violation, the observance of the rules contained in the L.D. 
No. 231/2001 and, if compatible, the provisions of the CPC. It is first 
necessary to refer to the rules established by L.D. No. 231/2001. Where 
there are gaps in the legislation, as a supplementary or secondary means, 
one can draw upon the CPC.
112
 The fact that Art. 34 refers to the CPC only 
if the rules thereof are compatible with the L.D. No. 231/2001 has 
understandably led to the conclusion that there is no presumption of 
compatibility between the CPC and the special legislation.
113
  
These observations are also useful interpreting Art. 35, L.D. No. 
231/2001, which utilizes the same criteria to confer upon the corporation 
the same procedural safeguards that apply to the defendant, if compatible. 
Also in this case, it is not possible to assume that the entire CPC intended 
for the defendant can be applied when the defendant is a corporation. One 
must select, among the rules intended for the defendant, those that do not 
conflict with the rationale of proceedings that involve corporations. From 
a practical point of view, this examination is rather problematic, as will be 
discussed in greater detail, especially with regard to the questioning of the 
corporation’s legal representative.114 
When outlining the main features of the corporate criminal liability 
proceeding, it is first necessary to identify the cases that must be dismissed 
immediately. Art. 8, L.D. No. 231/2001, in affirming the principle of 
autonomy between the liability of the individual and that of the 
corporation, clearly intends to pursue the corporation independently of 
what happens to the individual agent. Nevertheless, Art. 37, L.D. No. 
 
 
 111. The L.D. No. 231/2001 has created a real and proper mini-code: Franco Cordero, 
PROCEDURA PENALE 1327 (Giuffrè IX ed. 2012). 
 112. Gianluca Varraso, supra note 59, at 104. In fact, the procedural regulations contained in L.D. 
No. 231/2001 prevail over those found in the CPC in accordance with the principle of speciality: Trib. 
Milano, February 5th 2008, Enipower, FORO AMBROSIANO 221 (2008). 
 113. Massimo Ceresa Gastaldo, IL “PROCESSO ALLE SOCIETÀ” NEL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231 
10 (Giappichelli 2002). 
 114. See infra Part VII.  
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231/2001 introduces a conspicuous exception to the rule, establishing the 
non prosecution of the corporation if the criminal prosecution against the 
individual should not have been initiated or continued because of lack of 
the procedural requirements necessary to move forward.
115
  
The strong connection between proceedings against corporations and 
those against individuals is further proven by Art. 36, L.D. No. 231/2001 
which, in entrusting the corporate liability trial to a criminal judge, 
specifies that it must be the same judge from whom the administrative 
violation has arisen. Moreover, the L.D. No. 231/2001 appears to favor the 
simultaneus processus, in which the judge is called upon to ascertain 
corporate responsibility as well as that of the individual in the same 
proceeding.
116
 The trials will be separated if the proceeding against the 
individual has been suspended or concluded with special proceedings (i.e. 
plea bargaining) or when the unification of the two proceedings is 
precluded by procedural provisions.
117
 The Legislature decided to unify 
the two trials to promote efficacy and consistency, as well as to assure cost 
effectiveness.
118
 In this way, any potential incongruity between the two 
judgments could be avoided. The fact that the Legislature called for the 
separation of the trials when adherence to procedural provisions makes it 
necessary could become an easy expedient to nullify the rule of the 
unification of the trials.
119
 
The corporation participates in the criminal proceeding with its own 
legal representative,
120
 unless the representative is accused of the crime 
from which the administrative violation has arisen.
121
 This rule was 
established to avoid a conflict of interest. It is an absolute 
incompatibility
122
 which voids any act executed by this representative.
123
  
 
 
 115. In the Italian system, the overwhelming majority of crimes provided for by the criminal code 
must be prosecuted by the Prosecutor. For other crimes, however, prosecution is contingent on peculiar 
conditions. The most well-known is certainly the “querela” (complaint). A complaint, in fact, shall be 
submitted by means of a statement in which the victim requests the prosecution of an act deemed an 
offense by law.  
 116. Art. 38, § 1, L.D. No. 231/2001.  
 117. Art. 38, § 2, L.D. No. 231/2001.  
 118. See Ministerial Report, supra note 14, at 453. 
 119. Art. 38, § 2, c, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 120. In order to participate in the trial, the corporation must file a written statement at the Clerk’s 
Office of the presiding judge. Otherwise, the trial will proceed in absentia. Art. 39—41, L.D. No. 
231/2001. 
 121. Art. 39, § 1, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 122. See Cass., sez. VI, June 19th 2009, Caporello, CASS. PEN. 1381 (2010).  
 123. Because of this incompatibility, the representative (who has a conflict of interest) cannot 
appoint a defense attorney for the corporation: supra note 122, at 1382. 
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In case of conflict of interest, the corporation could decide not to 
nominate a new legal representative. Nevertheless, by doing so, it would 
be precluded from participating in the proceeding. It could, on the other 
hand, nominate a new legal representative or designate one ad hoc for the 
trial.
124
 
VII. EVIDENCE ACCORDING TO L.D. NO. 231/2001 
L.D. No. 231/2001 dedicates only one rule concerning evidence, 
deeming the provisions contained in the CPC applicable for the rest. The 
only regulation establishes that the individual accused of the crime from 
which the administrative violation has arisen, as well as the legal 
representative who occupied the role at the time the crime was committed, 
may not be heard as witnesses.
125
 Requiring the testimony of the defendant 
or party whose position could be involved in the trial (the legal 
representative when the crime was committed) would have violated the 
right to remain silent that the Italian system guarantees those subject to a 
criminal proceeding.
126
 
Art. 44 does not address the scenario in which a new legal 
representative, who did not occupy this position when the crime was 
committed, is appointed to represent the corporation throughout the trial. 
The legislation by excluding the testimony of the individual accused of the 
crime, as well as the corporation’s legal representative in power when the 
crime was committed, implicitly affirms that the corporation’s “new” 
representative is a witness and, as such, is obligated to respond. 
Nevertheless, the corporation participates in the proceedings through 
its representative.
127
 Therefore, requiring the newly appointed 
representative to testify when the corporation has opted for a change in 
leadership violates the corporation’s right to remain silent and conflicts 
with the corporation’s right to defend itself. In fact, Art. 39 L.D. No. 
231/01 imposes a replacement in the event the legal representative is 
accused of the crime from which the administrative violation stems and 
the corporation intends to participate in the proceedings.
128
 This raises 
serious concerns regarding legitimacy since the corporation is guaranteed 
the procedural safeguards that apply to the defendant, if compatible.
129
 
 
 
 124. Massimo Ceresa-Gastaldo, PROCEDURA PENALE DELLE SOCIETÀ 60 (Giappichelli 2015). 
 125. Art. 44, § 1, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 126. Art. 64 CPC. 
 127. Art. 39, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 128. See supra Part VI. 
 129. Art. 35, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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Scholars are divided on the issue. There are those who propose 
repealing the obligation to testify, given the evident illegitimacy of the 
right of defense’s violation brought by the provision,130 and others who do 
not recognize this conflict.
131
 The scholars who adhere to the latter view 
argue that the new representative should testify to the facts and 
circumstances present when the illegal activity took place because he did 
not represent the corporation at that time. The new representative would 
maintain the status of the defendant only while he is carrying out the 
function of representing the corporation. 
Neither of these views, however, appears acceptable. The first view 
should be disregarded because it results in an abrogatio legis which must 
be left to the Legislature and cannot be executed by the hand of the 
interpreter. The second view is flawed because it requires the legal 
representative to change roles (witness-defendant) intermittently. This 
exegesis does not exclude the violation of the right to remain silent but, 
rather, recognizes it in a certain sense. The new representative—due to the 
principle of organic identification or “being one and the same with”—is 
the corporation. Requiring this representative to testify as to what 
transpired at the time of the transgression could result in self-
incrimination. This is a clear contradiction of the fact that the corporation 
has the same safeguards as the defendant. Paramount among these 
protections is nemo tenetur se detegere. 
The Italian criminal system appears to possess a useful antidote. Art. 
198, § 2 CPC establishes that a witness cannot be compelled to provide 
self-incriminating testimony.
132
 This rule would also apply in proceedings 
against a corporation, according to Art. 34, L.D. No. 231/2001 that deems 
the rules contained in the CPC to be applicable, if compatible with the 
different proceeding. The evaluation of compatibility, with respect to this 
rule, would lead to a positive outcome because it would then be possible to 
protect the right to silence in proceedings against the corporations, albeit 
with more restricted margin of application.  
Art. 198, § 2 CPC could, likewise, be applied with some adjustments 
for the different context within which it is employed. This would mean 
 
 
 130. Massimo Ceresa Gastaldo, supra note 113, at 29; Paolo Ferrua, Il processo penale contro gli 
enti: incoerenze e anomali nelle regole di accertamento, in RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI PER ILLECITI 
AMMINISTRATIVI DIPENDENTI DA REATO, at 234 f. 
 131. Giorgio Fidelbo, La testimonianza: casi di incompatibilità, in REATI E RESPONSABILITÀ 
DEGLI ENTI. GUIDA AL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231, at 501. Regarding the right to not respond to 
questions relating to circumstances of which the representative has become aware due to the role he 
assumed after the commission of the alleged crime. Gianluca Varraso, supra note 59, at 386. 
 132. Maria Lucia Di Bitonto, supra note 39, at 83. 
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that when the new representative is queried regarding facts that could 
potentially compromise the corporation, he could not be compelled to 
respond. 
This guarantee could be deemed too modest to adequately protect the 
representative who personifies the corporation/defendant, since it was 
intended for the witness who is generally extraneous to the facts being 
evaluated at trial. Promoting this safeguard would, furthermore, serve as 
anesthetic for the vulnus created by the gap in the legislation
133
 and would 
settle a question that otherwise would merit a de iure condendo solution. 
These concerns, however, are easily overcome for several reasons. 
Firstly, based on the actual wording of Art. 44, L.D. No. 231/2001, the 
new representative is a witness for all legal intents and purposes. 
Secondly, the safeguard established by Art. 198, § 2 CPC is an extremely 
elastic regulation that allows for numerous practical applications. 
According to the degree of the witness’s involvement in the circumstances 
being evaluated, the rule can be applied with greater or less frequency. 
When a witness, such as the corporation’s new representative, is 
significantly involved in the proceeding, the article serves to neutralize all 
those questions that could solicit self-incriminating answers. 
Adopting this solution implies leaving many decisions to the discretion 
of the judge presiding over the trial. The judge has the authority to exclude 
a question or, alternatively, to compel the witness to respond. The answers 
that should not have been provided (because they would violate a legal 
prohibition) must be excluded from evidence.
134
 One could argue that this 
safeguard does not represent adequate protection, considering what is at 
stake. The prejudice that jeopardizes the corporation’s right to defend 
itself is not eliminated (at the most, it is only lessened) if certain 
knowledge, once acquired, is then excluded from the evidence. 
Nevertheless, the application of Art. 198, § 2 CPC in the “231” system 
constitutes the most persuasive solution to guarantee the right to silence, 
without reforming the legislation.  
VIII. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES 
During the process of evaluating the corporation’s liability, a critical 
role is entrusted to the precautionary procedure, which often represents a 
decisive junction in the “231” system.  
 
 
 133. Art. 44, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 134. Art. 191 CPC. 
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The sub-proceeding can constitute the incidental (interlocutory) phase 
of the criminal proceeding and employs precautionary measures that can 
attack the corporation’s assets, immobilizing them through seizure or 
temporarily inhibiting the corporation from carrying out certain activities 
(disqualifying measures). There are two objectives that L.D. No. 231/2001 
intends to achieve: to avoid dispersion of the corporate assets that serve as 
guarantees for the civil obligations derived from the crime and to 
“paralyze” or reduce the corporation’s activity when continuation of such 
activity would aggravate or extend the consequences of the offence or 
facilitate the commission of other crimes.
135
 The first requirement can be 
satisfied with a conservative seizure,
136
 which will not be discussed in this 
paper because it mainly refers to civil liability for compensation for 
damages. The second aim is achieved with a preventive seizure
137
 and 
disqualifying measures.
138
  
The precautionary procedure is pivotal because it is the first moment at 
which the corporation can express its willingness to change course and 
move towards legality. The attention dedicated to the precautionary 
measures is also due to the devastating consequences that these measures 
can have on the corporation. It is not surprising that judicial precedents in 
these first ten years of experimentation have mainly focused on this 
procedure. There have been significantly fewer decisions issued during the 
conclusive stage of the proceeding, in which the Court rules on corporate 
liability. This phenomenon is largely due to the tremendous impact that 
precautionary decisions can have on the criminal proceeding, especially if 
the Cassation confirms them. When the corporation is likely to be found 
guilty, it has a clear incentive to opt for a special proceeding, as provided 
for by the CPC.
139
 This decision allows the corporation to settle the 
question more quickly, renouncing many of the safeguards guaranteed by 
an ordinary proceeding (most important of which is the gathering of 
evidence through cross-examination) in order to obtain a reduced sentence. 
When analyzing the specific precautionary measures outlined in L.D. 
No. 231/2001, it is appropriate to begin with disqualifying measures (those 
that preclude the corporation from carrying out some of the activities listed 
in its business purpose). 
 
 
 135. Refer to Ministerial Report, supra note 14, at 454. 
 136. Art. 54, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 137. Art. 53, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 138. Art. 45 f., L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 139. Book 6, CPC. 
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The first noteworthy observation is that the disqualifying measures 
coincide with the disqualifying sanctions imposed during the conclusive 
phase of the trial when the corporation liability is determined.
140
 This 
peculiarity has raised concerns among legal scholars because it legitimizes 
the application of precautionary measures with the obvious objective of 
anticipating the sentence and without a definitive ruling.
141
 This scenario 
has been specifically excluded in the case of precautionary measures 
applied to individuals because it conflicts with the defendant’s right to the 
presumption of innocence.
142
 This principle, notwithstanding some doubts 
mentioned previously, should also prevail in the proceedings against 
corporations.
143
  
The Ministerial Report tends to play down the importance of the 
overlap, observing that even if the application of disqualifying measures 
during the precautionary procedure could appear to be an anticipation of 
the definitive sentence, it would still be instrumental in guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the judicial evaluation.
144
 Nevertheless, upon closer 
examination, the real purpose of the precautionary procedure of the 
corporate system is special-preventive: the preemptive measures, in other 
words, serve to minimize the danger of recidivism by bringing those 
corporations that are inclined to reform back to legality and abandoning 
those that do not.  
In any case, the decision to use the sanctions as a precautionary 
disqualifying measure leads to a series of necessary observations. 
Traditionally, in the Italian system, the precautionary procedure cannot 
disregard potential conclusions that would be reached in the ordinary 
proceeding. For example, resorting to precautionary measures is precluded 
if it is presumable—in light of the evidence available—that the trial cannot 
lead to a guilty decision.
145
 Furthermore, during the precautionary phase, 
the court is not allowed to take measures that cannot be imposed at the end 
 
 
 140. See supra Part V. The prospect of applying revocatory measures (among the disqualifying 
sanctions) during the precautionary phase presents a significant raises numerous concerns. These 
measures could entail, for example, revoking financing already allocated or rescinding authorizations, 
licenses and concessions. Given their definitive nature, revocatory measures are not well-suited to a 
temporary application. For this reason, scholars tend to exclude them from the precautionary realm, 
only allowing for suspension of the corresponding activities. See Massimo Ceresa Gastaldo, supra note 
113, at 42.  
 141. See Francesco Peroni, Il sistema delle cautele, in RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI PER ILLECITI 
AMMINISTRATIVI DA REATO, at 244 f. 
 142. Giulio Illuminati, Costituzione e processo penale, GIUR. IT. 2 (2008). 
 143. See supra Part III. 
 144. Ministerial Report, supra note 14, at 455. 
 145. Art. 273, § 2, CPC. 
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of the trial.
146
 These are essential safeguards that are also found in the 
parallel “231” system.147 Therefore, if it is already clear during the 
incidental phase that the trial cannot end with a certain disqualifying 
sanction, that disqualification cannot be applied during the preemptive 
phase, either.  
This reasoning leads to the first conclusion. As previously mentioned, 
disqualifying sanctions, unlike financial penalties, can be imposed at the 
end of the proceeding only if explicitly provided for (as a consequence of 
the violation attributed to the corporation).
148
 The judge can employ the 
most serious sanctions only for administrative violations stemming from 
some of the crimes that implicate corporate criminal liability.
149
 However, 
this is not the only prerequisite. It is necessary to prove the existence of a 
sizeable profit and that the collective entity has already violated the law in 
the past.
150
 Furthermore, application of disqualifying sanctions would 
nevertheless be precluded when the corporation expressed its commitment 
to reforming its conduct and regaining legality, as outlined in Art. 17, L.D. 
No. 231/2001. 
The utilization of a precautionary measure must be excluded if, at the 
time of evaluation, it is already possible to determine that the same 
sanction could not be applied at the end of the trial. Furthermore, 
preemptive disqualifying measures cannot be imposed when the 
proceeding involves an administrative violation stemming from a crime 
for which the application of disqualifying sanctions is not provided (or the 
application of that specific disqualifying sanction is not called for).
151
 In 
fact, it is the very nature of the precautionary phase which excludes the 
possibility that the temporary measure can obtain something more than 
that which is possible to achieve with a definitive sentence.
152
 Moreover, 
 
 
 146. Art. 275 CPC. 
 147. Massimo Ceresa-Gastaldo, supra note 124, at 113.  
 148. Giorgio Fidelbo, Le misure cautelari, in REATI E RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI. GUIDA AL D. 
LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231, at 515. 
 149. Arts. 24–25 duodecies D.L. No. 231/01. Supra note 87. 
 150. Art. 13, L.D. No. 231/2001. See supra Part V. 
 151. See Cass., Sez. II, March 12th 2007, D’Alessio, 18 GUIDA DIR. 82 (2007). The Cassation’s 
decision annulled an order with which the Benevento Court had applied a temporary prohibition 
against carrying out business activity as a precautionary measure during a proceeding in which the 
alleged crime was aggravated fraud to obtain public funds, for which the corresponding disqualifying 
sanction is not provided. The decision highlights the more rigorous approach by the Court of Cassation 
compared to that of a lower court. Adonella Presutti, Le cautele interdittive nel processo de societate, 
al vaglio della sperimentazione applicativa, in STUDI IN ONORE DI MARIO PISANI—vol. I—DIRITTO 
PROCESSUALE PENALE 708 (Piero Maria Corso et al. eds., La Tribuna 2010) 
 152. See Fidelbo, supra note 148, at 514 f. See also PAOLO Moscarini, LE CAUTELE INTERDITTIVE 
NEL PROCEDIMENTO PENALE “DE SOCIETATE” 23 (Aracne 2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CRACKING DOWN ON CORPORATE CRIME IN ITALY 431 
 
 
 
 
the disqualifying sanction cannot be imposed if the following conditions 
exist: the corporation has demonstrated reparative actions and internal 
reorganization; it has not obtained a substantial profit; or it has not 
previously violated L.D. No. 231/2001.
153
 
After reconstructing the relationship between precautionary measures 
and disqualifying sanctions, we must address the prerequisites necessary 
to apply the former. There must be serious indications of the corporation’s 
liability—fumus commissi delicti—as well as specific, credible elements 
supporting the concrete risk of the crimes reoccurring—periculum in 
mora.
154
 
According to judicial precedent regarding the precautionary procedure 
for individuals, the judge presiding over the precautionary phase must put 
himself in the position of the trial judge and thereby decide if the evidence 
available would result in an affirmation of liability.
155
 
First and foremost, there must be serious indications that the accused is 
guilty of the alleged crime.
156
 In fact, only when this first criterion is 
satisfied can the judge proceed to examine additional constitutive elements 
of the administrative violation.
157
 It is necessary to verify that for the 
specific crime, disqualifying sanctions, which correspond to the 
precautionary measures proposed, can be applied, and if so, that the 
elements exist for that crime.
158
 Once these conditions are met, the judge 
must then evaluate the administrative violation in its entirety.  
On the one hand, verification of the alleged crime is absolutely 
necessary in order for the judge appointed during the precautionary phase 
to make a prognostic judgment. On the other hand, when dealing with 
corporations, the decision during the precautionary procedure cannot stop 
with the prognostic judgment relating to the alleged crime—as has 
happened in certain cases.
159
 Therefore, a disqualifying measure against a 
 
 
 153. Art. 13, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 154. Art. 45, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 155. Cass., Sez. un., April 21st 1995, Costantino, CASS. PEN. 2837 (1995). 
 156. Art. 45, § 1, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 157. Fidelbo, supra note 148, at 521. 
 158. In accordance with the principle of autonomy between the responsibility of legal entities and 
that of individuals (Art. 8, L.D. No. 231/01), in order to affirm corporate liability, it is sufficient that 
the objective element subsists for the alleged crime; it is irrelevant whether an offender has been 
identified or, if identified, whether he can be punished. 
 159. This widespread practice by the lower Courts has been censored by the Court of Cassation. 
Cass., sez. VI, June 23rd 2006, La Fiorita Soc. coop. A.r.l., CASS. PEN. 87 (2007); Cass., sez. II, June 
26th 2008, Morabito ed altro, C.E.D. CASS., n. 240169; Cass., sez. VI, March 5th 2013, Orsi, ivi, n. 
254719. On this point, See Silvia Renzetti, Azione cautelare nei confronti della persona fisica e 
dell’ente: reciproche interferenze, in www.dirittopenalecontemporaneo, December 18th 2013, at 9 f. 
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corporation must be linked to the other prerequisites for an administrative 
violation: in fact, once the prognostic evaluation has been concluded, the 
judge must then review the other constitutive elements of the 
administrative violation. He must determine whether the offense was 
committed in the interest, or to the advantage, of the corporation, and if it 
was executed by one of the subjects (corporate officers and subordinate 
employees) that can create corporate liability.
160
 
If the alleged crime is found to have been committed by an employee, 
the judge will have to confirm the lack of ante factum compliance 
programs in order to impose a disqualifying measure.
161
 Whether he has to 
carry out the same assessment for a crime committed by a corporate 
officer is debatable.
162
 In this scenario, the corporation would have to 
prove the conditions required to exclude itself from liability (due to the 
burden of proof apparently being inverted by Art. 6, L.D. No. 
231/2001).
163
  
Notwithstanding judicial precedents to the contrary, the Court of 
Cassation has affirmed that corporation can only be required to adopt 
adequate compliance programs.
164
 The evaluation of their adequacy is 
entrusted to the judge. Furthermore, the judge must examine any 
fraudulent evasion of the procedures provided for by the programs, and 
confirm the existence of a Surpervisory and Control Body and the 
effectiveness of its oversight.
165
 The judge called to apply the 
precautionary measures, after having ascertained to which category 
(corporate officer or employee) the agent of the crime belongs, has to 
verify that there are no conditions that could exclude the corporation from 
liability.
166
 
Subsequently, due to the required correlation between precautionary 
measures and disqualifying sanctions, the judge must also ascertain the 
existence of the other elements that would abstractly allow for the 
application of a disqualifying penalty, such as a sizeable profit or 
repetition of the illegal acts.
167
 
 
 
By the same author, See Misure cautelari applicabili agli enti: primi interventi della Cassazione, 
CASS. PEN. 4228 (2007). 
 160. Fidelbo, supra note 148, at 521. 
 161. Id. at 524. 
 162. Id.. 
 163. See supra Part IV. 
 164. See supra Part IV. 
 165. Giorgio Fidelbo, supra note 148, at 524. 
 166. Id. 
 167. This conclusion has been embraced by judicial precedents (See Cass., sez. II, December 20th 
2005, Jolly Mediterraneo S.r.l., CASS. PEN. 76 (2007); Cass., sez. VI, June 23rd 2006, La Fiorita, supra 
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After concluding that there are serious indications of corporate liability, 
the judge is then left to examine the other prerequisite to impose 
preemptive measures: precautionary needs. He must deduce from specific, 
well-founded elements that there is real danger of the corporation 
repeating offenses of the same nature in the future.
168
 The fact that the 
Legislature has identified this as the only precautionary need
169
 further 
confirms the special-preventive purpose of the preemptive disqualifying 
measures that clearly have the aim of reducing recidivism. The danger that 
the corporation will reoffend can be excluded if, for example, there is an 
effective change in management or restitution of the profit from the 
crime.
170
 
After the judge has concluded that there are serious indications of 
liability and a high risk of recidivism, he then selects the most suitable 
preemptive measure for the case at hand.
171
 The measure has to be 
proportionate to the severity of the offense and to the sanction that 
abstractly could be applied.
172
 
Due to the proportionality principle, the measures cannot be applied 
together,
173
 and disqualification of the corporation’s activity is only 
warranted when other precautionary measures have proven to be 
inadequate.
174
 The Legislature did not specify that the precautionary 
disqualifying measures must be aimed at the specific department or area 
within which the crime is assumed to have been committed, like for the 
homologous sanctions.
175
 Nevertheless, it’s possible to reach this 
conclusion by way of interpretation.
176
  
 
 
note 57, at 84 f.) and scholars (Massimo Ceresa Gastaldo, supra note 113, at 40; Giorgio Fidelbo, 
supra note 148, at 522). 
 168. Scholars have highlighted that the prerequisites for the periculum have not been clearly 
defined, giving the judge excessive discretion. Giovanni Paolozzi, VADEMECUM PER GLI ENTI SOTTO 
PROCESSO. ADDEBITI “AMMINISTRATIVI” DA REATO (DAL D.LGS. n.231 DEL 2001 ALLA LEGGE n.146 
DEL 2006) 149 (Giappichelli 2006). 
 169. In the CPC, Art. 274 provides that precautionary measures can be adopted even for the 
danger of tampering with evidence or a flight risk. 
 170. Cass., sez. VI, June 22nd 2010, Polistirolo S.r.l. and another, RIV. PEN. 716 (2011). 
 171. It is useless, in other words, to apply a more onerous measure if the periculum can be 
neutralized by less afflictive means.  
 172. Art. 46, § 2, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 173. The prohibition against multiple measures only concerns those that are disqualifying. 
Therefore, the concurrent application of a preventive disqualifying measure and seizure (preventive or 
conservative) is allowed. Cass., sez. un., March 27th 2008, Fisia Italimpianti S.p.a., CASS. PEN. 4544 
(2008).  
 174. Art. 46, § 3, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 175. Art. 14, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 176. Cass., sez. VI, January 25th 2010, Impresa Ferrara S.n.c., CASS. PEN. 3535 (2011). 
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Moreover, we must address the peculiarity of the precautionary phase. 
The order issued by the judge at the request of the Prosecutor has to be 
preceded by a hearing in which the corporation has the opportunity to take 
part.
177
 This essentially creates an “early” right to be heard. In the 
precautionary model for individuals, however, the questioning—the first 
chance for the defendant to speak on the matter—is subsequent to the 
application of the precautionary measure.
178
 
The hearing can perform various functions. It can provide the first 
opportunity for the corporation to demonstrate that it has adopted 
compliance programs ante delictum. This condition, if supported by the 
other circumstances provided for by Articles 6 and 7, L.D. No. 231/2001, 
should lead the judge to declare the absence of serious indications of 
culpability. In this case, he must reject the request for precautionary 
measures. If the corporation proves that it implemented the compliance 
programs post factum, the judge could deem these programs adequate to 
neutralize the danger of recidivism and, therefore, not apply the 
precautionary measures for lack of the necessary prerequisites.  
If the corporation lacks compliance programs when it has the hearing 
in chambers, this can be the place to communicate its intention to adopt 
such programs. The corporation can demonstrate its commitment to 
reparative conduct that, during the conclusive phase of the trial, would 
prevent disqualifying sanctions from being applied and attenuate financial 
penalties (compensation for the damage, elimination of the harmful or 
dangerous consequences of the crime, restitution of the profit). Art. 49, 
L.D. No. 231/2001, in fact, provides for the suspension of the preventive 
measures if the corporation asks for the opportunity to fulfill its reparative 
obligations. In such cases, the judge who grants the corporation’s request 
establishes a security deposit or collateral that must be supplied by the 
corporation.
179
 If the reparative conduct or reorganization is nonexistent, 
incomplete, or not effective, the security deposit will be acquired by the 
State.
180
 In the inverse scenario, the security deposit will be returned to the 
corporation and the precautionary measure that was temporarily suspended 
will be completely revoked.
181
 
A provision for suspension of the precautionary measures undoubtedly 
presupposes that the preventive disqualification has already been 
 
 
 177. Art. 47, §§ 2–3, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 178. Art. 294, CPC. 
 179. Art. 49, § 1, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 180. Art. 49, § 3, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 181. Art. 49, § 4, L.D. No. 231/01. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss3/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CRACKING DOWN ON CORPORATE CRIME IN ITALY 435 
 
 
 
 
applied.
182
 There is no reason, however, why the corporation cannot 
express its willingness to reform before the judge rules on the 
precautionary question.
183
 In other words, the judge could, upon receiving 
the request to apply precautionary measures, simultaneously suspend them 
for the time necessary for the corporation to fulfill the reparative 
requirement. This would prevent a corporation that intends to cooperate 
from suffering, even for a short period of time, the serious consequences 
resulting from the disqualifications. 
Finally, the other preemptive measure provided for by the “231” 
system—preventive seizure184—also deserves some consideration. Like 
disqualifying measures, preventive seizure has the objective of preventing 
recidivism.
185
 It can be applied to the same items for which confiscation 
would be allowed: price and profit derived from the crime.
186
  
In spite of the intentions declared by the Legislature, it does not appear 
that preventive seizure is intended to prevent other crimes or to preclude 
the aggravation of the consequences of those offenses presumed to have 
already been committed. Upon closer examination, if it is true that 
disqualifying measures and preventive seizure in the “231” system have 
the same ratio, this is because both are forms of an anticipated execution 
of the sentence. As we have observed, confiscation is an automatic and 
obligatory sanction when the corporation is found liable. Seizure aims to 
prevent the dispersion of corporate assets, thereby assuring that other 
sanctions can be imposed in the future.  
The inextricable link between precautionary measures and the final 
sentence implies that a preventive seizure must be contingent on a positive 
evaluation—even if merely prognostic—of the conditions that, at the end 
of the proceeding, would allow for confiscation. Therefore, the judge has 
to verify the existence of serious indications of liability as well as the 
existence of profit gained from the crime. Furthermore, he must ascertain 
the danger of corporate assets being dispersed which could compromise a 
future confiscation.
187
  
 
 
 182. See Adonella Presutti, Le misure cautelari interdittive, in MANUALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ 
DEGLI ENTI, at 281. 
 183. Tommaso Emilio Epidendio, Il sistema sanzionatorio e cautelare, in ENTI E RESPONSABILITÀ 
DA REATO. ACCERTAMENTO, SANZIONI E MISURE CAUTELARI 449 (Alessandra Bassi & Tommaso 
Emilio Epidendio eds., Giuffrè 2006). 
 184. Art. 53, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 185. See supra note 135. 
 186. Art. 19, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 187. See Adonella Presutti, Le misure cautelari reali, in MANUALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ 
DEGLI ENTI, at 300.  
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Judicial precedent, which at first deemed the mere existence of the 
illegal act sufficient to warrant preventive seizure, has recently concluded 
that the prerequisite for the seizure of corporate assets prior to their 
confiscation must coincide with the prerequisites for preemptive 
disqualifying measures.
188
 This conclusion surrounds the adoption of the 
real precautionary measure with greater safeguards and, at the same time, 
further highlights its affinity with the definitive sanction applicable after 
the corporation is found guilty. The preventive seizure described in L.D. 
No. 231/2001 tends to deprive the agent of the crime of the associated 
proceeds. The necessary relationship with the alleged offender must, 
therefore, orient the judgment towards ascertaining the existence of serious 
indications of liability—even during the precautionary phase.189 
IX. DYNAMICS OF THE ORDINARY PROCEEDING FROM REGISTRATION OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATION TO ISSUING THE FINAL JUDGMENT  
The importance of the precautionary system which, as an incidental 
segment of the trial, takes place during the preliminary investigations, 
confers on these investigations a decisive role in the “231” system. This 
represents an inversion of the equilibrium that characterizes proceedings 
against individuals—at least compared to how these proceedings are 
regulated by the CPC—in which everything revolves around the trial (the 
phase in which evidence is gathered through cross-examination).
190
 The 
Prosecutor utilizes the preliminary investigations to decide whether or not 
to prosecute. Nevertheless, they generally remain unknown to the judge 
who must convict or absolve the defendant at the end of the trial.
191
 
In the “231” system, precautionary measures are the main instruments 
used to quickly react when faced with the most serious incidences of 
corporate crime. The balance, therefore, tilts towards the preliminary stage 
of the proceeding. The corporation subjected to these measures is naturally 
 
 
 188. In the “231” system, confiscation is a main and obligatory sanction. Therefore, the real 
preventive measure (seizure) needed to ensure a future confiscation requires a more comprehensive 
evaluation of the liability serious indications: Cass., sez. VI, 31st May 2012, Codelfa, CASS. PEN. 794 
(2013). In order to apply this sanction (that presupposes a complete evaluation), during the 
investigative phase, elements that concretely demonstrate the consistency of the Prosecutor’s 
reconstruction and that allow for a favorable prognosis of future conviction, must exist. See Francesca 
Ruggieri, Art. 53—Sequestro preventivo, in LA RESPONSABILITÀ AMMINISTRATIVA DELLE SOCIETÀ E 
DEGLI ENTI. D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231 1136 (Marco Levis et al. eds., Zanichelli 2014). 
 189. Guido Todaro, Il sequestro preventivo, funzionale alla confisca per equivalente, di beni di 
una persona giuridica: il rebus dei reati tributari, CASS. PEN. 2831 2832 (2014). 
 190. See Maria Lucia Di Bitonto, Le indagini e l’udienza preliminare, in REATI E 
RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI. GUIDA AL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231, at 592. 
 191. Art. 431, CPC. 
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inclined to take advantage of the mechanisms available to quickly 
neutralize the detrimental effects of the disqualifications. The first 
opportunity could arise during the hearing in chambers in which the judge 
decides whether to accept the Prosecutor’s request for precautionary 
measures. During this hearing, therefore, the parties debate the existence 
of applicable prerequisites for the measures. If these prerequisites are met, 
the discussion turns to the corporation’s willingness to execute reparative 
actions in order to obtain suspension of the disqualifying measure.  
When subjected to a criminal proceeding, corporations try to find a 
rapid solution, not only to resolve the precautionary issue but, more 
generally, to contain the exorbitant costs and losses associated with the 
pending charges. For this reason, companies tend to manifest their 
willingness to collaborate immediately (implementing compliance 
programs, compensating for damages and restoring the status quo ante). 
As we have seen, these reparative actions lead to the suspension of 
precautionary measures and, when legal requirements have been 
effectively fulfilled, the eventual revoking of the same. Corporations then 
have the opportunity to request special proceedings with which they can 
settle the issue once and for all, which would otherwise be precluded.
192
 
Hence, the special-preventive nature of the “231” system yet again moves 
the equilibrium in corporate proceedings back to the preliminary 
investigations. 
Preliminary investigations start when the Prosecutor is informed of the 
administrative violation and proceeds to the registration, including 
information identifying the corporation, personal details of its legal 
representative and nomen iuris of the alleged crime.
193
 This annotation is 
entered in the same criminal register in which crimes committed by 
individuals are logged.
194
 As is the case for individuals, the moment of 
annotation marks the beginning of a six-month period during which it is 
possible to carry out investigations.
195
 At the end of this term, the 
 
 
 192. The summary trial requested by the defendant that is generally based on investigative acts, 
and that guarantees a reduction of the final sentence by a third, is precluded when the administrative 
violation calls for a definitive disqualifying sanction (Art. 62, § 4, L.D. No. 231/2001). Therefore, the 
corporation can agree upon a sentence with the Prosecutor through plea-bargaining if, among the other 
conditions, the administrative violation only provides for a financial penalty (Art. 63, § 1, L.D. No. 
231/2001). For this reason, the company is generally keen on collaborating. After reparative and 
compensatory conducted, a disqualifying sanction can no longer be imposed. The preclusion of a 
disqualifying penalty, in turn, assures the corporation the opportunity to define its position with special 
proceedings.  
 193. Art. 55, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 194. Art. 55, § 1, L.D. No. 231/01 and Art. 335, CPC. 
 195. Art. 405, § 3, CPC. 
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Prosecutor is prohibited from conducting new investigations that, if 
carried out, would be excluded.
196
  
L.D. No. 231/2001 does not actually establish this sanction. The fact, 
however, that the Legislature established a time limit for the investigations 
(which is the same for individuals) has led to a general consensus that Art. 
407 CPC is applicable. Art. 407, in fact, calls for the exclusion of 
investigations conducted after the deadline and this prevision has been 
deemed compatible with the corporate criminal liability system.
197
  
As is the case for the parallel institution of annotation, it is possible to 
inform the corporation or its defense attorney of the registration upon their 
request, unless there are prohibitive conditions that would not allow for 
communication of the alleged crime to its presumed perpetrator.
198
  
Since the corporation could have no knowledge of the pending charges 
(perhaps it has never requested information regarding possible annotations 
in its name), a notice of investigation can be sent to the company.
199
 This 
is the provision by which the suspect must be informed of the existence of 
a proceeding against it when the Prosecutor must carry out an activity for 
which the defense attorney has the right to be present. To allow for 
effective execution of the right to a defense, the notice also indicates the 
legal provisions allegedly violated as well as the time and place in which 
the criminal act is presumed to have transpired.
200
  
Art. 57, L.D. No. 231/2001 only provides that the notice of 
investigation must contain an invitation to provide or choose an address 
for service and inform the corporation of the need to file a statement in 
order to join the proceeding. Also in this case, it is necessary to refer to the 
above-mentioned CPC in order to identify when the notice has to be sent 
(when the investigation requires the presence of a defense attorney) and 
establish additional communications that must be issued and adapted to 
the peculiarities of corporate proceedings. Considering the complexity of 
the administrative violation, the notice of investigation will have to not 
 
 
 196. Art. 407, § 3, CPC. 
 197. Massimo Ceresa Gastaldo, supra note 113, at 60; Luca Pistorelli, Le indagini preliminari e 
l’udienza preliminare nel procedimento per l’accertamento della responsabilità degli enti giuridici da 
reato, in Various Authors, LA RESPONSABILITÀ AMMINISTRATIVA DEGLI ENTI (D. LGS.8 GIUGNO 2001, 
N. 231) 306 (Ipsoa 2002). 
 198. Art. 55, § 2, L.D. No. 231/2001. Art. 335, §§ 3–4 CPC that prohibits communication of the 
annotation to the alleged perpetrator of the offense, the victim and their attorneys when the proceeding 
involves crimes of a particularly serious nature (including those listed in Art. 407, § 2, a CPC), such as 
those associated with the mafia or—even beyond these crimes—when there are specific needs 
concerning the investigative activity.  
 199. Art. 57, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 200. Art. 369 CPC. 
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only report the legal provision(s) allegedly violated and the time/place of 
the presumed crime but also the category (corporate officer or employee) 
to which the presumed agent belongs.
201
 
At the end of the investigation, the Prosecutor has two alternatives: 
proceed with the case or dismiss the charges. In the case of the latter, we 
find the most significant difference with respect to proceedings against 
individuals. L.D. No. 231/2001 provides that the Prosecutor can dismiss 
the charges de plano.
202
 The CPC, on the other hand, establishes that the 
Prosecutor only has the authority to request dismissal.
203
 The judge, in 
fact, must authorize the Prosecutor not to bring about the criminal 
action.
204
 
The decision not to prosecute the corporation is, however, not 
completely devoid of all controls. Dismissal of the charges, in fact, must 
be communicated to the Attorney General at the Court of Appeals.
205
 The 
Attorney General may carry out verifications and, if necessary, proceed 
with the charges.  
Entrusting the Prosecutor with the decision of whether to bring about 
criminal action or not was strongly criticized by scholars because it was 
considered detrimental to the principle of mandatory prosecution 
established by Art. 112 of the Constitution.
206
 Nevertheless, a minority 
argues that this solution is in line with the constitutional provision since 
mandatory prosecution would not necessarily be guaranteed by assigning 
the determination to a judge.
207
  
Dismissal can be ordered when the Prosecutor cannot proceed with the 
charges against the corporation (for example, if the crime is not explicitly 
provided for by the “231” system), or in the case of having exceeded the 
statute of limitations
208
 or when the administrative violation lacks 
foundation.
209
 
When the case cannot be dropped, the Prosecutor brings charges 
against the corporation with an act that includes the following: information 
identifying the corporation, a clear and precise description of the criminal 
 
 
 201. Alessandro Bernasconi, Indagini e udienza preliminare, in MANUALE DELLA 
RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI, at 315. 
 202. Art. 58, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 203. Art. 408, CPC. 
 204. Art. 409, CPC. 
 205. Art. 58, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 206. Paolo Ferrua, Il processo penale contro gli enti, supra note 130, at 225; Luca Pistorelli, supra 
note 197, at 2531. 
 207. Maria Lucia Di Bitonto, supra note 190, at 618. 
 208. See supra Part V. 
 209. Alessandro Bernasconi, supra note 201, at 317. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
440 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:403 
 
 
 
 
action from which corporate liability could arise, an indication of the 
presumed crime, the articles of law allegedly violated as well as sources of 
evidence.
210
 The scrupulous description of the constitutive elements in the 
formal notice of charges gives the corporation necessary information to 
effectively defend itself. 
The above mentioned act can directly open the trial for minor 
offenses.
211
 More serious crimes must pass through a filter—the 
preliminary hearing—referred to a judge who responds to the Prosecutor’s 
request, issuing the decree for committal to trial or declaring the judgment 
of no grounds to proceed when there is a cause that extinguishes the 
offense or when it is impossible to prosecute the administrative violation, 
when the illegal act itself did not occur or the evidence acquired turns out 
to be insufficient, contradictory or not suitable to sustain the prosecution 
before the trial judge.
212
 
The L.D. No. 231/2001 dedicates little attention to the trial. We can 
infer that the Legislature deemed it sufficient to defer to the CPC. One 
could also interpret this decision as further confirmation of the minor 
importance of this stage compared to the investigative phase. Furthermore, 
it is significant that section VII L.D. No. 231/2001, which is dedicated to 
the trial, begins with a provision giving the corporation another 
opportunity to regain legality. Art. 65, L.D. No. 231/2001, in fact, 
provides for suspension of the proceedings when the corporation—before 
the Court of first instance declares the trial open
213—asks to fulfill the 
obligations described in Art. 17, L.D. No. 231/2001. Satisfying these 
obligations, as previously explained, precludes the application of 
disqualifying sanctions. The corporation must, however, demonstrate that 
it was not able to fulfill these obligations sooner. Without this caveat, a 
corporation that has not been subjected to precautionary measures would 
 
 
 210. Art. 59, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 211. The Prosecutor prosecutes by means of direct summons for trial in cases of misdemeanours 
or crimes punishable either with the penalty of imprisonment not exceeding a maximum term of four 
years or by fine, only or jointly by fine and the aforementioned imprisonment (Art. 550, CPC). 
 212. Art. 61, § 1, L.D. No. 231/2001. Given the great importance of reparative measures in the 
“231” system, it would have been opportune to provide for this conduct as an ad hoc cause for 
dismissal during the investigative stage and acquittal in the subsequent phases, Hervé Belluta, Le 
indagini e l’udienza preliminare, in DIRITTO PENALE DELLE SOCIETÀ—VOL. I, at 1376, 1382.  
 213. This time limit that, in the Italian criminal proceeding, falls between the resolution of any 
preliminary issues and the trial evidentiary hearing, on the one hand, avoids carrying out evidentiary 
activity that could be made useless by the reparative conduct and, on the other hand, allows the 
corporation an adequate spatium temporis for the request, especially when moving directly to the trial 
without a preliminary hearing. See supra note 14, at 463. 
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not have any incentive to quickly adopt the organizational counter-
measures (compensation for damages and re-structuring).
214
  
The judge who grants the suspension establishes a period of time 
within which the corporation must fulfill these obligations as well as a 
security deposit, which serves as a guarantee. This is the same mechanism 
utilized for the suspension of the precautionary measures.
215
 The amount 
deposited as a guarantee will be returned to the corporation if it does, in 
fact, fulfill its obligations as promised. In this case, if the judge—upon 
resuming the trial—recognizes the existence of the prerequisites for the 
administrative violation, he will only apply a reduced financial sanction. A 
disqualifying penalty would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the 
corporation does not fulfill its obligations within the acceptable timeframe, 
the security deposit will be acquired by the State. If the judge finds the 
corporation guilty, he will have recourse to the full arsenal of sanctions 
provided for that specific administrative violation.  
The section dedicated to the trial closes with potential judgments that 
can be issued at the end of the proceeding. The Legislature, proposing the 
tri-partition typical of the CPC, distinguishes between the following 
sentences: acquittal, non prosecution and conviction.
216
 
The first of these possible judgments presupposes a lack of the 
constitutive elements of the administrative violation.
217
 An analogous 
decision can be reached when evidence of the administrative violation is 
missing, insufficient or contradictory.
218
 The decision not to prosecute 
must be made in the following scenarios: the alleged crime was already 
time-barred before the corporation was accused of the administrative 
violation or the statute of limitations for the administrative sanction has 
been exceeded.
219
  
If, on the other hand, the judge affirms that the administrative violation 
has been substantiated, he pronounces a judgment of conviction and, when 
applying a disqualifying sanction, specifies the activity and structures that 
will be affected.
220
  
 
 
 214. See supra note 14, at 463. Contra Adolfo Scalfati, Le norme in materia di prova e di 
giudizio, in RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI ENTI PER ILLECITI AMMINISTRATIVI DIPENDENTI DA REATO, at 
363, according to whom the formula should be interpreted with a certain amount of forbearance. 
 215. Artt. 65, 49, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 216. Section VII, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 217. Art. 66, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 218. Art. 66, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 219. Art. 67, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
 220. Art. 69, L.D. No. 231/2001. 
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The corporation can submit an application for appellate remedy when 
the sentence applies a disqualifying penalty.
221
 If financial sanctions have 
been imposed, the corporation can only challenge them if the same 
opportunity has been afforded to the individual who committed the alleged 
crime—in the cases and with the procedures established for the 
defendant.
222
 The legislation regarding appellate remedies, even if limited, 
seeks to achieve two objectives. The first aim is to avoid, where possible, 
conflicting decisions between the judgment issued against the individual 
and that against the corporation. Secondly, the regulation aims to give the 
corporation every opportunity to appeal decisions that impose 
disqualifying sanctions.
223
 
The Prosecutor can file the same appeals allowed for the crime upon 
which the administrative violation is contingent.
224
 
Once the proceeding has concluded with a judgment of conviction, the 
legislation gives the corporation one last chance to collaborate. This is 
further proof that for L.D. No. 231/2001, it is never too late to get back on 
the right track and to be rewarded for this decision. If the corporation 
demonstrates having belatedly implemented reparative measures (within 
twenty days of the notice of the abstract of the sentence having been 
served), it can request that the judge convert the disqualifying sanction 
into a financial penalty. While awaiting the judge’s decision, the sanction 
is suspended as long as the judge does not deem the request blatantly 
unfounded.
225
 
X. L.D. NO. 231/2001: MORE THAN A DECADE LATER 
After more than ten years of L.D. No. 231/2001 having been in force, it 
is possible to evaluate how it has been applied from a practical 
perspective. 
First of all, it is important to highlight that this special legislation did 
not “take off” immediately, notwithstanding the fact that by now there are 
numerous proceedings against corporations in the most important Italian 
 
 
 221. Art. 71, § 2, L.D. No. 231/01. 
 222. See supra note 14, at 463. 
 223. Ministerial Report, supra note 14, at 465. 
 224. Art. 71, L.D. No. 231/2001. Giorgio Spangher, Le impugnazioni, in RESPONSABILITÀ DEGLI 
ENTI PER ILLECITI AMMINISTRATIVI DIPENDENTI DA REATO, at 373, analyzes the problems that emerge 
from the inadequate legislation regarding appellative remedies, maintaining that they cannot be easily 
resolved by applying the rules contained in the CPC.  
 225. Art. 78, L.D. No. 231/2001. See Enrico Gallucci, L’esecuzione, in REATI E RESPONSABILITÀ 
DEGLI ENTI. GUIDA AL D. LGS. 8 GIUGNO 2001, n.231, at 739. For the quantification, the judge takes 
into account the seriousness of the illegal activity and the reasons for the belated separative conduct. 
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Courts, such as those in Rome and Milan, which routinely deal with the 
most serious incidences of corporate crime.
226
 This is undoubtedly a 
byproduct of the reluctance to accept societas delinquere potest as well as 
to address criminal issues of a markedly corporate nature. Furthermore, 
during a period of financial crisis, like the one we are currently 
weathering, there has been resistance due to concerns that businesses, 
especially small to medium-sized companies, would not survive to the 
enormous costs associated with the proceedings. It is not coincidental that 
the majority of cases in which the L.D. No. 231/2001 has been applied 
involve large corporations.
227
 This is one of the consequences of the 
specific offenses targeted by the legislation.  
There is another important consideration. The ante factum compliance 
programs evaluated by judges thus far have not passed the assessment of 
adequacy. This undoubtedly represents a point of great concern for 
corporations. The only instance in which a company was acquitted due to 
conformity of its programs has recently been annulled by the Court of 
Cassation.
228
 This trial stage, however, has served to help judges to 
identify the characteristics of a desirable program and corporations to 
implement an organizational structure that can effectively protect them 
from the risk of crime and, consequently, from being subject to a criminal 
proceeding. 
One could nevertheless debate the utility of implementing a 
compliance program ante delictum. The failed experience might encourage 
corporations to assume the risk of crime and then decide to adopt a 
suitable program during the proceeding, utilizing the numerous 
opportunities offered by L.D. No. 231/2001. This may be true in the 
American system in which the Prosecutor is in charge of the criminal 
action and, therefore, can decide not to file charges when the corporation 
expresses its willingness to change. In Italy, on the contrary, the lack of an 
ante factum program forces the Prosecutor (in the presence of the other 
constitutive elements of the administrative violation) to proceed to the 
annotation and precludes dismissal (even if the corporation reformed its 
organizational structure during the investigations). A different conclusion 
could be reached if the Legislature heeded suggestions from scholars and 
recognized the implementation of reparative measures (organizational 
 
 
 226. Marco Onado, Gli scandali societari italiani, in Various Authors, IMPRESA E GIUSTIZIA 
PENALE: TRA PASSATO E FUTURO 59 (Giuffrè 2009). 
 227. As confirmed by case-law, CODICE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ “DA REATO” DEGLI ENTI 
ANNOTATO CON LA GIURISPRUDENZA, 26 f. (Stefano Maria Corso eds., Giappichelli III ed. 2015). 
 228. See supra note 71. 
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restructuring along with compensation for damages) as a cause for 
dismissal.
229
  
At present, the lack of a pre-existing program (adopted before the 
crime) exposes the corporation to the risk of being convicted, even at the 
outcome of the special proceedings that companies can access more easily 
when they demonstrate—throughout the trial—a certain collaborative 
spirit. 
Furthermore, one cannot underestimate the fact that implementing a 
program post factum implies a series of obligations that must be fulfilled 
by the corporation (which would not have to be accounted for in the 
opposite hypothesis). As explained earlier, the company must compensate 
the victim for the damage, eliminate the harmful or dangerous 
consequences of the crime and relinquish the profit derived from the 
offense. In the case of an ante delictum program deemed adequate, even 
when the individual is convicted, the judgment of acquittal would release 
the corporation from these commitments. 
Furthermore, even though L.D. No. 231/2001 does not obligate 
companies to organize themselves in such a way as to neutralize the risk of 
crime, those who have relationships with the corporations (for instance, 
public administrations) often require it. Hence, if an investment must be 
made to adopt a model, the corporation might as well make a serious effort 
and take advantage of the occasion to acquire a structure that effectively 
guarantees legality. 
Companies created as a mere front for organized crime, will clearly not 
view the “231” system as an opportunity. As previously noted, however, 
the legislation is principally aimed at “healthy” companies that are 
nevertheless willing to accept the risk of crimes being committed within 
their organization in exchange for greater profit.
230
 L.D. No. 231/2001 has 
made this risk uneconomical, not so much due to the financial penalty 
(even though it represents a cost to the corporation) but, rather, due to the 
introduction of the disqualifying sanction. It is worth reiterating that the 
disqualifying sanction can be applied as a precautionary measure and 
could even force the corporation out of the market. This sanction 
represents an unknown variable and is, therefore, unacceptable for 
companies that must survive in a competitive marketplace like Italy. For 
this reason, the system serves to promote greater legality. 
 
 
 229. See supra note 212. 
 230. See supra note 20. 
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The purpose of L.D. No. 231/2001 is, moreover, decidedly preventive. 
Paradoxically, the best indication of success of this legislation is—to a 
large extent—not found in its application but, rather, in the effects that it 
can produce simply as a result of having been implemented. In any case, a 
longer period of observation—more than the first ten years of the 
legislation being in-force—is needed in order to accurately assess the 
effectiveness of the “231” system. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
